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LINEAR LOGIC FOR CONSTRUCTIVE MATHEMATICS
MICHAEL SHULMAN
Abstract. We show that numerous distinctive concepts of constructive math-
ematics arise automatically from an interpretation of “linear higher-order logic”
into intuitionistic higher-order logic via a Chu construction. This includes
apartness relations, complemented subsets, anti-subgroups and anti-ideals, strict
and non-strict order pairs, cut-valued metrics, and apartness spaces. We also
explain the constructive bifurcation of classical concepts using the choice be-
tween multiplicative and additive linear connectives. Linear logic thus system-
atically “constructivizes” classical definitions and deals automatically with the
resulting bookkeeping, and could potentially be used directly as a basis for con-
structive mathematics in place of intuitionistic logic.
1. Introduction
One of the explicit motivations of Girard’s linear logic [Gir87] was to recover an
involutory “classical” negation while retaining “constructive content”:
. . . the linear negation . . . is a constructive and involutive negation; by
the way, linear logic works in a classical framework, while being more
constructive than intuitionistic logic. [Gir87, p3]
One might therefore expect that over the past three decades some practicing con-
structive mathematicians would have adopted linear logic instead of intuitionistic
logic;1 but this does not seem to be the case. One might conjecture many reasons
for this. However, I will instead argue that constructive mathematicians (going
back all the way to Brouwer) have been using linear logic without realizing it!
Of course I don’t mean this literally; what I mean is that there are aspects of
constructive mathematical practice that are better explained by linear logic than
by intuitionistic logic. Specifically, the non-involutory nature of intuitionistic nega-
tion often leads constructive mathematicians to study both a classical concept and
its formal de Morgan dual, such as equality and apartness, subgroups and antisub-
groups, topological spaces and apartness spaces, and so on. We will show that such
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1I will use “intuitionistic” to refer to the formal logic codified by Heyting, and “constructive” for
the programme of doing mathematics with “constructive content”. This is unfaithful to the original
philosophical meaning of “intuitionistic”, but for better or for worse the phrase “intuitionistic logic”
has come to refer to Heyting’s logic, and I have been unable to think of a satisfactory alternative.
I will use “classical” to refer to classical mathematics and classical nonlinear logic, and “linear”
to refer to the “classical” form of linear logic with an involutive negation.
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“dual pairs of propositions” can be regarded as single propositions in a model of
linear logic: a Chu construction [Chu78] applied to the Heyting algebra of intuition-
istic propositions. Notions such as apartness relations then arise automatically by
writing a classical definition in linear logic and interpreting it in this model.
This observation can be used at multiple levels. Firstly, it formalizes a technique
for “constructivizing” classical definitions: write them in linear logic and pass across
this interpretation. This method often yields a better result than the usual one of
simply regarding the classical connectives as having their intuitionistic meanings;
the latter often requires manual “tweaking” to become constructively sensible.
We also obtain a uniform explanation for why “constructivizing” is multi-valued:
in linear logic the connectives “and” and “or” bifurcate into “additive” and “mul-
tiplicative” versions, and making different choices about when to use one or the
other leads to different constructive versions of a classical definition. (There are, of
course, also other reasons for the constructive multifurcation of concepts.)
Roughly speaking, the additive “P or Q” is the intuitionistic disjunction, while
the multiplicative version “P par Q” represents the pattern “if not P , then Q;
and if not Q, then P” that is often used constructively when the intuitionistic
disjunction is too strong. For instance, the rational numbers are a field in the
strong “geometric” sense that every element is either zero or invertible. The real
numbers are not a field in this sense, but they are a field in the weaker “Heyting”
sense that every element is either zero par invertible: i.e. every nonzero2 element is
invertible, and every noninvertible element is zero. Similarly, for real numbers x ≤ y
is not equivalent to “x = y or x < y”, but it is equivalent to “x = y par x < y”.
In §§9–10 we will see that a systematic use of par can solve various problems in
intuitionistic constructive mathematics, such as defining a notion of “metric space”
that includes the Hausdorff metric, or a union axiom for a “closure space” that is
not unreasonably strong.
Secondly, we can also translate proofs. Many classical proofs are also linearly
valid, hence can be translated into intuitionistic proofs of theorems involving apart-
ness relations, antisubgroups, and so on: the process of “turning everything around”
to deal with such concepts can be automated. This works for classical proofs that
may use proof by contradiction (or equivalently the law of double negation) as long
as they avoid the law of excluded middle. In intuitionistic logic, the laws of double
negation and excluded middle are equivalent, but linear logic disentangles them.
Having an automatic way to produce intuitionistic definitions and proofs is more
than just a convenience: it can prevent or correct mistakes. Working explicitly with
apartness relations and their ilk is tedious and error-prone: it’s easy to omit one
of the contrapositive conditions, or forget to check that a function is strongly con-
tinuous or that a subset is strongly extensional. Moreover, it’s not always obvious
exactly what the axioms on an apartness structure should be; but translating from
linear logic always seems to give the right answer (or at least a right answer).
Thirdly and finally, once we have climbed from intuitionistic to linear logic using
the Chu construction, we can kick away the ladder. That is, we can consider adopt-
ing linear logic as an alternative to intuitionistic logic as a basis for constructive
mathematics (in the informal sense of “mathematics with constructive content”).
There is no generality lost in this, because the Chu construction embeds intuitionis-
tic logic in linear logic, and moreover the former can be recovered inside the latter
2Here “nonzero” means “apart from zero”.
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by using the “of course” modality !. On the other hand, there is a gain in generality,
since not every model of linear logic is a Chu construction (see §11).
In this paper, we will mainly focus on the first application: translating definitions.
This provides a simple way for a reader familiar with intuitionistic constructive
mathematics to gain familiarity with linear logic and how its variety of connectives
can be used to represent constructive concepts. The second and third applications
also involve proofs in linear logic, which take some additional getting used to; we
will sketch a few such proofs in this paper, but not make systematic use of them.
Outline. In §2 we describe our viewpoint on linear logic informally, analogously to
the BHK interpretation of intuitionistic logic; no prior familiarity with linear logic is
required. Then in §§3 and 4 we formalize it as a Chu construction for propositional
and higher-order logic. Most introductions to linear logic present it as a logic of
“resources” or “games”; we view it as a logic of mathematics, like intuitionistic logic
and classical logic, which is designed to be “constructive” in a different way than
intuitionistic logic.
The rest of the paper consists of “case studies”, showing that rewriting classical
definitions directly in linear logic and passing across this interpretation yields well-
known notions in intuitionistic constructive mathematics. In §§5 and 6 we treat
sets and functions, then algebra in §7, order relations in §8, real numbers in §9, and
topology in §10. Finally, in §11 we consider how one might motivate and explain a
linear constructive mathematics on purely philosophical grounds.
Acknowledgments. My understanding of constructive mathematics and linear
logic has been greatly influenced by Toby Bartels, Mart´ın Escardo´, Andrej Bauer,
Dan Licata, Valeria de Paiva, Todd Trimble, and Peter LeFanu Lumsdaine.
2. A meaning explanation
Intuitionistic logic is often explained informally (e.g. in [TvD88a]) by the so-
called Brouwer–Heyting–Kolmogorov (BHK) interpretation, which explains the mean-
ing of the logical connectives and quantifiers “pragmatically” in terms of what
counts as a proof of them. For instance, a few of the rules are:
• A proof of P → Q is a method converting any proof of P into a proof of Q.
• A proof of P ∨Q is either a proof of P or a proof of Q.
• A proof of ¬P is a method converting any proof of P into a proof of an
absurdity.
This leads to the rules of intuitionistic logic; for instance, we cannot prove P ∨ ¬P
in general since we cannot decide whether to give a proof of P or a proof of ¬P .
Practicing constructive mathematicians, however, have found that it is often
not sufficient to know what counts as a proof of a statement: it is often just as
important, if not more so, to know what counts as a refutation of a statement. For
instance, while it is of course essential to know that two real numbers are equal
if they agree to any desired degree of approximation, it is also essential to know
that they are unequal if there is some finite degree of approximation at which they
disagree. If real numbers are defined using Cauchy sequences x, y : N → Q with
specified rate of convergence |xn−xm| <
1
n
+ 1
m
, then we want to separately define
(x = y)
def
= ∀n.|xn − yn| ≤
2
n
(x 6= y)
def
= ∃n.|xn − yn| >
2
n
.
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In classical logic, a refutation of P means a proof of ¬P , and these two definitions
are each other’s negations. But intuitionistic negation is not involutive, and x 6= y
is not the logical negation of x = y. Thus, when constructive mathematics is done
in intuitionistic logic — as it usually is — we must define inequality as a new
apartness relation with which the set of reals is equipped. In Bishop’s words:
It is natural to want to replace this negativistic definition [the logical
negation of equality] by something more affirmative. . . Brouwer himself
does just this for the real number system, introducing an affirmative
and stronger relation of inequality. . . Experience shows that it is not
necessary to define inequality in terms of negation. For those cases
in which an inequality relation is needed, it is better to introduce it
affirmatively. . . [BB85, p10]
Similar things happen all throughout constructive mathematics. In addition to
knowing when an element is in a subgroup, we need to know when an element is
not in a subgroup; thus we introduce antisubgroups (and similarly anti-ideals, etc.).
In addition to knowing when a point is in the interior of a set, we need to know
when it is in the exterior of a set; thus we introduce apartness spaces [BV11].
To repeat, the problem is that the BHK interpretation and resulting intuitionistic
logic privilege proofs over refutations. In the words of Patterson [Pat98]:
Once we take on the Brouwerian view that proofs should be construc-
tions, both negation and “falsity” disappear because absurdity is not
the same thing as demonstratively false. This is because a construc-
tion leading to a contradiction does not mean that we can provide a
counterexample.. . .
In intuitionistic logic we have taken “true” to be primitive as well as
“absurdity”.. . . Thus, a “proof leading to absurdity” is a derived notion
of falsity and the only one afforded to us in intuitionistic logic.
Negative information can be just as constructive as positive informa-
tion.. . . the correct way to use negative information in a constructive
setting would be to do the “opposite” or “backward” construction in
some way. [Pat98, p8–9]
This suggests a BHK-like explanation of logical connectives in terms of both what
counts as a proof and what counts as a refutation. We now explore what such an
explanation might look like. The only requirement we impose is that no formula
should be both provable and refutable (but see Remarks 3.5 and 3.9).
We start with the following explanations of conjunction and disjunction, which
we denote ⊓ and ⊔ rather than ∧ and ∨ as a warning that they will not behave
quite like the usual intuitionistic or classical connectives.
• A proof of P ⊓Q is a proof of P together with a proof of Q.
• A refutation of P ⊓Q is either a refutation of P or a refutation of Q.
• A proof of P ⊔Q is either a proof of P or a proof of Q.
• A refutation of P ⊔Q is a refutation of P together with a refutation of Q.
These “proof” clauses are the usual BHK ones, while the “refutation” clauses are
natural-seeming de Morgan duals. The most natural clauses for negation are:
• A proof of P⊥ is a refutation of P
• A refutation of P⊥ is a proof of P .
This negation is involutive, P⊥⊥ ≡ P , with strict de Morgan duality: (P ⊓Q)⊥ ≡
P⊥ ⊔Q⊥ and (P ⊔Q)⊥ ≡ P⊥ ⊓Q⊥. (≡ denotes inter-derivability.)
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A little thought suggests that one natural explanation of implication (which we
indulge in some foreshadowing by writing as⊸) is:
• A proof of P ⊸ Q is a method converting any proof of P into a proof of Q,
together with a method converting any refutation of Q into a refutation of P .
• A refutation of P ⊸ Q is a proof of P together with a refutation of Q.
Remark 2.1. This does not mean that when we prove an implication we must also
prove its contrapositive explicitly. The “proofs” in these explanations, like those
in the BHK interpretation, are not the “proofs” that a mathematician writes in a
paper (or even formalizes on a computer). Rather they are “verifications”, “fully
normalized proofs”, or “data that must be extractable from a proof”. Not every
intuitionistic proof (in the ordinary sense) of P ∨Q begins by deciding whether to
prove P or Q, but intuitionistic logic satisfies the “disjunction property” that from
any proof of P ∨ Q we can extract either a proof of P or a proof of Q. Similarly,
any proof of P ⊸ Q must contain enough information to transform refutations of
Q into refutations of P as well as proofs of P into proofs of Q.
Building contraposition into the definition of implication makes it unsurprising
that we get (P ⊸ Q) ≡ (Q⊥ ⊸ P⊥). So it might seem that we are going to fall
into classical logic, but this is not the case. For instance, classically we have ¬(P →
Q) ≡ P∧¬Q; but despite the apparent presence of this law in the “refutation” clause
for⊸, we do not have (P ⊸ Q)
⊥ ?≡ P ⊓Q⊥. Instead we have (P ⊸ Q)⊥ ≡ P⊠Q⊥,
where ⊠ is a different kind of conjunction:
• A proof of P ⊠Q is a proof of P together with a proof of Q.
• A refutation of P ⊠Q is a method converting any proof of P into a refutation
of Q, together with a method converting any proof of Q into a refutation of P .
Note that P ⊓Q and P ⊠Q have the same proofs, but different refutations. Both
refutation clauses are based on the idea that P and Q cannot both be true, but
to refute P ⊓ Q we must specify which of them fails to be true, whereas to refute
P ⊠Q we simply have to show that if one of them is true then the other cannot be.
This suggests that P ⊠ Q is stronger than P ⊓ Q, and in fact we can justify
(P ⊠ Q) ⊸ (P ⊓ Q) on the basis of our informal explanations. Since P ⊠ Q and
P ⊓ Q have the same proofs, it suffices to transform any refutation of P ⊓ Q into
a refutation of P ⊠Q. The former is either a refutation of P or of Q; without loss
of generality assume the latter. Then we can certainly produce a refutation of Q
that doesn’t even need to use a proof of P . On the other hand, given a refutation
of Q it is impossible that we could also have a proof of Q; so by ex contradictione
quodlibet from any proof of Q we can vacuously produce a refutation of P .
It follows that the de Morgan dual P ⊠ Q
def
= (P⊥ ⊠Q⊥)⊥ of ⊠ is weaker than
⊔. (For a discussion of notation, see Notation 2.2.) Its explanation is:
• A proof of P ⊠ Q is a method converting any refutation of P into a proof of
Q, together with a method converting any refutation of Q into a proof of P .
• A refutation of P ⊠Q is a refutation of P together with a refutation of Q.
Thus P ⊠Q has the same refutations as P⊔Q, but more proofs: while P⊔Q supports
proof by cases, P ⊠Q supports only the disjunctive syllogism. As noted in §1, P ⊠Q
encapsulates a common constructive pattern for weakening definitions when the
intuitionistic “or” is too strong: rather than asserting that one of two conditions
holds, we assert that if either one of two conditions fails then the other must hold.
We have (P ⊸ Q) ≡ (P⊥ ⊠Q), a version of the classical law (P → Q) ≡ (¬P ∨Q).
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A reader familiar with linear logic may recognize ⊠ and ⊠ as its multiplicatives,
while ⊓ and ⊔ are its additives,3 with ⊸ as its linear implication. Indeed, this ex-
planation is similar to the “game semantics” of linear logic, in which a “proposition”
is regarded as a game or interaction between a “prover” and a “refuter”.
Actually, our explanation justifies not fully general linear logic but affine logic,4
because in the nullary case (“true” and “false”) the distinctions collapse:
• There is exactly one proof of ⊤.
• There is no refutation of ⊤.
• There is no proof of ⊥.
• There is exactly one refutation of ⊥.
These are units for both additive and multiplicative connectives: P⊓⊤ ≡ P⊠⊤ ≡ P
and P ⊔⊥ ≡ P ⊠⊥ ≡ P . The most nontrivial part of this is the refutations of P⊠⊤
(or dually the proofs of P⊥ ⊠⊥), which by definition consist of a method transform-
ing any proof of ⊤ into a refutation of P , together with a method transforming any
proof of P into a refutation of ⊤. The former is essentially just a refutation of P ;
but given this, there can be no proof of P , so the latter method is vacuous.
The quantifiers are essentially additive; we write them as
⊔
/
d
instead of ∃/∀.
• A proof of
⊔
x.P (x) is a value a together with a proof of P (a).
• A refutation of
⊔
x.P (x) consists of a refutation of P (a) for an arbitrary a.
• A proof of
d
x.P (x) consists of a proof of P (a) for an arbitrary a.
• A refutation of
d
x.P (x) is a value a together with a refutation of P (a).
We have de Morgan dualities
(⊔
x.P (x)
)⊥
≡
d
x.P (x)
⊥
(d
x.P (x)
)⊥
≡
⊔
x.P (x)
⊥
and also “Frobenius” laws involving the multiplicative connectives:
P ⊠
⊔
x.Q(x) ≡
⊔
x.(P ⊠Q(x)) P ⊠
d
x.Q(x) ≡
d
x.(P ⊠Q(x)).
But P ⊓
⊔
x.Q(x)
?
≡
⊔
x.(P ⊓Q(x)) fails: a refutation of
⊔
x.(P ⊓Q(x)) consists of,
for every a, either a refutation of P or a refutation of Q(a); while a refutation of
P ⊓
⊔
x.Q(x) must decide at the outset whether to refute P or to refute all Q(a)’s.
This explanation of the connectives and quantifiers solves the problem mentioned
above with equality and inequality of real numbers. If we define
(x = y)
def
=
d
n.|xn − yn| ≤
2
n
then we find that (assuming that (p < q)
⊥ ≡ (p ≥ q) for p, q ∈ Q)
(x = y)⊥ ≡
⊔
n.|xn − yn| >
2
n
.
Thus, the correct notions of equality and inequality for real numbers are each other’s
negations, relieving us of the need for a separate “apartness relation”.
The “linearity” of linear logic is that ⊠ and ⊠ are not idempotent: P ⊠ P 6≡ P
and P ⊠ P 6≡ P . A proof of P ⊠ P consists of a method (well, technically two
methods) for converting any refutation of P into a proof of P . Since P cannot be
both provable and refutable, this is equivalently a method showing that P cannot
be refuted — which is, of course, different from saying that it can be proven.
3The origin of the terminology is apparently the fact that the distributive law in linear logic
is P ⊠ (Q ⊔R) ≡ (P ⊠Q) ⊔ (P ⊠R), i.e. “multiplication distributes over addition”.
4But I will nevertheless continue using the word “linear” in many places, partly for name
recognition, and partly with potential generalizations in mind; see §11.
LINEAR LOGIC FOR CONSTRUCTIVE MATHEMATICS 7
Note that linear logic always satisfies the “multiplicative law of excluded middle”
P ⊠ P⊥ and the “multiplicative law of non-contradiction” (P ⊠ P⊥)
⊥
(in fact,
they are essentially the same statement). We call a proposition decidable if it
satisfies the additive law of excluded middle P ⊔ P⊥, or equivalently the additive
law of non-contradiction (P ⊓ P⊥)⊥. According to the above informal explanations,
decidability means that we have either a proof of P or a refutation of P .
It may help to understand ⊠ if we write out the meaning of (P ⊠Q)⊸ R, which
the reader can verify is equivalent to P ⊸ (Q⊸ R):
• A proof of (P ⊠Q)⊸ R consists of methods for:
– converting any proofs of P and Q into a proof of R,
– converting any proof of P and refutation of R into a refutation of Q, and
– converting any proof of P and refutation of Q into a refutation of R.
• A refutation of (P ⊠ Q) ⊸ R consists of a proof of P , a proof of Q, and a
refutation of R.
More generally, a proof of (P1 ⊠ P2 ⊠ · · ·⊠ Pn)⊸ R consists of “all possible direct
or by-contrapositive proofs” that contradict one of the hypotheses. By contrast:
• A proof of (P ⊓Q)⊸ R consists of:
– A method converting any proofs of P and Q into a proof of R, and
– A method converting any refutation of R into either a refutation of P or
a refutation of Q.
• A refutation of (P ⊓ Q) ⊸ R consists of a proof of P , a proof of Q, and a
refutation of R.
That is, when proving the (stronger) statement (P ⊓Q)⊸ R, the by-contrapositive
direction must use R to determine which of P or Q fails, whereas when proving
(P ⊠Q)⊸ R we are allowed to assume one of P and Q and contradict the other.
Finally, we define (P ˛ Q)
def
= (P ⊸ Q)⊓ (Q⊸ P ), with the following meaning:
• A proof of P ˛ Q consists of methods for converting:
– any proof of P into a proof of Q, and vice versa, plus
– any refutation of P into a refutation of Q, and vice versa.
• A refutation of P ˛ Q consists of either:
– a proof of P and a refutation of Q, or
– a refutation of P and a proof of Q.
This definition is usually constructively preferable to (P ⊸ Q)⊠ (Q⊸ P ).
Notation 2.2. Since we will be passing back and forth between intuitionistic and
linear logic frequently, to minimize confusion I have tried not to duplicate any
notations between the two contexts. As a mnemonic, our notations in the linear
context generally involve perpendicular lines ; thus we have⊠,⊓,⊔, ⊠,
d
,
⊔
,⊤,⊥5 in
place of the intuitionistic ∧,∨, ∀, ∃,1,0. We carry this principle over to non-logical
symbols as well, writing ⊑,⊏,⊏− and so on in place of the intuitionistic ≤, <,∈. (If
we were developing constructive mathematics purely within linear logic, without
bothering about interpreting it back into intuitionistic logic, then we could instead
reuse standard symbols with less risk of confusion. But of course the distinction
between ⊠/ ⊠ and ⊓/⊔ would still have to be maintained.)
5There is no uniformity in notation for linear logic. The most common notation for ⊠ is ⊗,
but ?,⊘, ◦,& are also used; whereas ⊠ has been denoted by `,⊕, •,⊙,>,, ♯, ∗. Notations for
⊓/⊔ include &/⊕, ∧/∨, and ×/+. Our ⊠/ ⊠ and ⊓/⊔ visually represent de Morgan duality, do
not clash with other standard notations that I know of, and are easily distinguishable.
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The main exceptions to this notational principle are the linear implication ⊸,
the exponentials !, ? (see below), and equality. The symbols ⊸, !, ? are associated
strongly enough with linear logic, and sufficiently visually distinctive, to need no
mnemonic. And the intuitionistic = can’t be made any straighter or more perpen-
dicular, so we instead write ⊜ for linear equality to evoke⊸.
In the intuitionistic context, will always use “slashed” symbols such as 6=, /∈, 6≤
and so on to denote strong “affirmative” negations, rather than the weak logical
negations such as ¬(x = y). In the linear context, the corresponding slashed sym-
bols 6⊜, 6⊏−, 6⊑ will refer to the involutive linear negation: (x 6⊜ y)
def
= (x ⊜ y)
⊥
.
3. The Chu construction
Like the BHK interpretation, the explanation of the linear connectives and quan-
tifiers in §2 is informal, and nonspecific about what constitutes a “method”. How-
ever, the relationship between the two interpretations is an instance of a precise
category-theoretic operation known as the Chu construction [Chu78, Chu79].
The Chu construction applies to any closed monoidal category with pullbacks
and an arbitrary chosen object, but here it suffices to describe its application to a
Heyting algebra H , with operations ∧,∨,→,1,0, and with 0 as chosen object. In
this case, Chu(H,0) is the lattice of pairs P = (P+, P−) of elements of H such that
P+ ∧ P− = 0, whose ordering is
(P ≤ Q)
def
= (P+ ≤ Q+ and Q− ≤ P−).
Its meets and joins are defined by
⊤ = (1,0) P ⊓Q = (P+ ∧Q+, P− ∨Q−)
⊥ = (0,1) P ⊔Q = (P+ ∨Q+, P− ∧Q−).
Any Chu construction is ∗-autonomous [Bar79], and Chu(H,0) is also semicartesian.
This means it has a symmetric monoidal structure with unit ⊤:
P ⊠Q
def
= (P+ ∧Q+, (P+ → Q−) ∧ (Q+ → P−))
(P ⊠Q)⊠R = P ⊠ (Q⊠R) P ⊠Q = Q⊠ P P ⊠⊤ = P
plus a right adjoint of ⊠ such that double-dualization into ⊥ is the identity:
P ⊸ Q
def
= ((P+ → Q+) ∧ (Q− → P−), P+ ∧Q−)
P ⊠Q ≤ R ↔ P ≤ Q⊸ R
(P ⊸ ⊥)⊸ ⊥ = P.
We then define
P⊥
def
= P ⊸ ⊥ P ⊠Q
def
= (P⊥ ⊠Q⊥)
⊥
.
These definitions match the informal explanations in §2. Thus any rigorous version
of the BHK interpretation, yielding a Heyting algebra that models intuitionistic
logic, can be enhanced to a model of affine logic matching our meaning explanation.
Remark 3.1. On the side of subsets rather than predicates, a notion corresponding
roughly to the Chu construction was already introduced by [BB85, Chapter 3, §2]
under the name complemented subset. See Theorem 6.11.
The Chu construction and the relation with linear logic also suggest some more
connectives. Linear logic introduces “exponential modalities” !P and ?P , which
categorically correspond to a special sort of dual comonad and monad.
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Definition 3.2. A Seely comonad [See89, Mel09] on a ∗-autonomous lattice is a
comonad ! (so that !!P = !P ≤ P ) such that6 !(P ⊓Q) = !P ⊠ !Q.
There is an induced monad ?P
def
= (!(P⊥))
⊥
, with P ≤ ?P = ??P , and the
!-coalgebras (elements P with P = !P ) are contravariantly equivalent to the ?-
algebras via (−)⊥. The condition !(P ⊓ Q) = !P ⊠ !Q is equivalent to its dual
?(P ⊔Q) = ?P ⊠ ?Q. In a semicartesian ∗-autonomous lattice (i.e. in affine rather
than general linear logic), we also have !(P ⊠Q) = !P ⊠ !Q and ?(P ⊠Q) = ?P ⊠?Q.
Theorem 3.3. Chu(H,0) admits a Seely comonad, for any Heyting algebra H.
Proof. The forgetful map (−)+ : Chu(H,0) → H has a fully faithful left adjoint
sending P to (P,¬P ), where ¬P
def
= (P → 0) is the Heyting negation. The induced
comonad, and its dual monad, are defined by
!P
def
= (P+,¬P+) ?P
def
= (¬P−, P−).
For the Seely condition, we compute
!(P ⊓Q) = (P+ ∧Q+,¬(P+ ∧Q+))
!P ⊠ !Q = (P+ ∧Q+, (P+ → ¬Q+) ∧ (Q+ → ¬P+))
and note that both refutation clauses are equivalent to (P+ ∧Q+)→ 0. 
Translated back to a meaning explanation, this yields the informal clauses:
• A proof of !P is a proof of P .
• A refutation of !P is a method converting any proof of P into an absurdity.
• A refutation of ?P is a refutation of P .
• A proof of ?P is a method converting any refutation of P into an absurdity.
The exponentials deal with the potential objection that not every constructive
proposition has a “strong dual”. For instance, not every set has an apartness rela-
tion. But there is always the Heyting negation ¬P
def
= (P → 0), and the propositions
!P are those whose refutations are the “tautological” ones of this form. We will
call a proposition in linear logic P affirmative if P ≡ !P . For instance, a set in
linear logic whose equality is affirmative corresponds to a set in intuitionistic logic
equipped with the denial inequality, (x 6= y)
def
= ¬(x = y).
It is also common to encounter propositions that are the Heyting negation of their
strong dual. For instance, while real numbers do not satisfy (x 6= y)
?
≡ ¬(x = y),
they do satisfy (x = y) ≡ ¬(x 6= y) (the inequality is tight). In linear logic these
are the propositions with P ≡ ?P , which we call refutative.
We can also understand ! by considering !P ⊸ Q. Since Q cannot be both
provable and refutable, if we can transform proofs of P into proofs of Q, then any
refutation of Q already entails the impossibility of a proof of P . Thus, in proving
!P ⊸ Q the contrapositive direction is subsumed by the forwards direction, giving:
• A proof of !P ⊸ Q is a method converting any proof of P into a proof of Q.
• A refutation of !P ⊸ Q is a proof of P together with a refutation of Q.
Unlike (P ⊸ Q)
⊥ ≡ (Q⊥ ⊸ P⊥), we only have (!P ⊸ Q)⊥ ≡ (Q⊥ ⊸ ?(P⊥)).
Thus !P is “usable multiple times” (since !P ≡ !P ⊠ !P ) but “not contraposable”.
The following is essentially one of the standard embeddings of intuitionistic into
linear logic [Gir87, p81].
6This is apparently the origin of the sobriquet “exponential”, since “exponentials turn additives
into multiplicatives” is akin to exp(a+ b) = exp(a) · exp(b).
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Theorem 3.4. For any semicartesian ∗-autonomous lattice with a Seely comonad,
the coreflective sub-poset of !-coalgebras is a Heyting algebra, with meet ⊠, join ⊔,
and implication !(P ⊸ Q). In Chu(H,0), this Heyting algebra is a copy of H. 
Thus the BHK interpretation of intuitionistic logic sits inside our explanation
of linear logic, so we have “two viewpoints on the same thing”. The value of the
linear viewpoint is its even-handed treatment of proofs and refutations, leading
to its involutive negation and strict de Morgan duality. The less useful Heyting
negation is relegated to the modalities.
Note that while Chu constructions are always ∗-autonomous, semicartesianness
and Theorem 3.47 are special properties of the case Chu(H,0). Other special prop-
erties of Chu(H,0), which we might choose to assume as additional axioms in purely
linear constructive mathematics, include the following:
P ⊓ (Q ⊔R) ≡ (P ⊓Q) ⊔ (P ⊓R) P ⊠ P ⊠ P ≡ P ⊠ P !P ≡ P ⊠ P
?(P ⊸ !P ) ?!P ⊢ !?P !(P ⊔Q) ≡ !P ⊔ !Q !(
⊔
x.P (x)) ≡
⊔
x.!P (x).
Remark 3.5. One might argue that Chu(H,0) is too large, as it contains propo-
sitions like (0,0) which are very far from being either provable or refutable. We
cannot constructively expect every proposition to be either provable or refutable,
but we might try some weaker restriction like ¬(¬P+∧¬P−). However, while propo-
sitions satisfying ¬(¬P+∧¬P−) are closed under finitary connectives, their closure
under quantifiers is equivalent to the non-constructive law of “double-negation shift”
(∀x.¬¬P (x)) → (¬¬∀x.P (x)). For a dramatic counterexample, let H = O(R) be
the open-set lattice of the real numbers, with x : R and P (x)
+ def
= R \ {x} and
P (x)
− def
= 0; then ¬(¬P (x)+ ∧ ¬P (x)−) for all x, but
d
x.(P (x)
+
, P (x)
−
) = (0,0).
Remark 3.6. On the other hand, Vickers [Vic96] explicitly suggests considering
separately for each proposition its affirmations and refutations :
Given an assertion, we can therefore ask –
• Under what circumstances could it be affirmed?
• Under what circumstances could it be refuted? [Vic96, p6]
From this perspective it is quite natural to suppose that there are some propositions
that can never be affirmed (i.e. proven) and also never refuted. The Chu construc-
tion can thus be viewed as an intensional theory of the proofs and refutations of
propositions without regard to their “truth”. Ignoring truth is constructively sen-
sible since we can never directly observe the truth of a proposition (we can only
affirm or refute it), and intensionality is sensible since two propositions that happen
to have the same extension (truth circumstances) might nevertheless have different
affirmations or refutations depending on how they are phrased.
Vickers defines a proposition to be affirmative if it is true exactly in the circum-
stances when it can be affirmed (i.e. proven), and refutative if it is false exactly in
the circumstances when it can be refuted. Our notion of affirmative proposition
is a bit stronger, and more intensional: roughly speaking, we call a proposition
affirmative if we know, by virtue of its definition, that whenever it is true it can be
affirmed, so that we can refute by showing that it cannot be affirmed. Similarly, we
call a proposition refutative if we know that whenever it is false it can be refuted,
so that we can affirm it by showing that it cannot be refuted.
7But there are other ways to obtain Seely comonads in Chu constructions; see e.g. [Bar91].
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If constructive logic is the logic of affirmative propositions, then affine logic is
the logic of propositions that are subject to both affirmation and refutation, and
the Chu construction is the canonical embedding of the former in the latter.
Remark 3.7. Even if H is a Boolean algebra, Chu(H,0) is larger than H . For
instance, Chu({0,1},0) = {(0,1) ≤ (0,0) ≤ (1,0)} coincides with three-valued
 Lukasiewicz logic, where (0,0) is called “unknown” or “undefined”.
Remark 3.8. Dan Licata has pointed out that the Chu construction interpretation of
linear logic into intuitionistic logic has certain parallels with the natural deduction
of [LC06] for classical (linear) logic that uses two judgments P true and P false.
Remark 3.9. There are other ways to add “constructive negation” to intuitionistic
logic. Go¨del’s “Dialectica” interpretation [Go¨d58] is similar; it also models linear
logic [dP89a, dP89b] and is closely related to the Chu construction [dP06]. But in
the Dialectica interpretation the forwards and backwards information is explicitly
carried by functions, rather than proofs as in the Chu construction.
There is also the “constructible falsity” logic of [Nel49], which by [Pat98] is
modeled by Chu(H,1). Compared to Chu(H,0), this drops even the requirement
¬(P+ ∧P−), allowing propositions like (1,1) that are both provable and refutable.
The lattice Chu(H,1) is ∗-autonomous but not semicartesian, so the units of ⊠ and
⊠ no longer coincide with those of ⊓ and ⊔. Instead we have the MIX rule [CS97],
i.e. the units of ⊠ and ⊠ coincide with each other; indeed they are precisely (1,1).
4. Types and predicates
The Chu construction for Heyting algebras gives a precise way to translate be-
tween linear and intuitionistic propositional logic. However, to do substantial math-
ematics we require not just a propositional logic but a first-order and even higher-
order logic. While attempting not to get bogged down by too much detail, in this
section we briefly describe a higher-order intuitionistic logic, a higher-order linear
logic, their semantics, and a Chu construction relating them.
Our higher-order intuitionistic logic is a form of the internal language of
elementary toposes; see e.g. [Jac99, Chapters 4 and 5] or [Joh02, D4.1]. We have
types, each containing terms or elements t : A that may involve variables belonging
to other types. For simplicity we do not allow types to involve variables, i.e. there
are no dependent types. There are certain type constructors :
• Finite product types A × B, whose elements are ordered pairs, and a unit
type 1 that has one element.
• Operation types8 BA, whose elements (called operations) are abstractions
λx.t of a term t : B depending on a variable x : A.
• A type Ω, whose elements are called propositions or formulas. A term of
type Ω depending on various variables is called a predicate.
The type Ω of propositions is equipped with the standard logical operations:
∧,∨,1,0,→,¬, ∀, ∃
and an entailment relation ⊢ that satisfies the usual intuitionistic rules of deduction.
Remark 4.1. We have a type of all propositions, so our logic is impredicative. But
this is primarily for convenience; I see no obstacle to the predicative case.
8Usually called function types; but for us “functions” will respect a given equality relation.
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Remark 4.2. We do not assume a basic logical equality predicate; instead we will
follow [Bis67, HJP80] in equipping types with defined equality relations (see §5).
This is mainly because I do not know a satisfactory set of rules for equality types in
linear logic. As observed by [Gri82], the most obvious choice of such rules essentially
forces all equalities to be affirmative, which is certainly not what we want.
We also have no “comprehension” of predicates. This simplifies the logic and
semantics, though it requires sets to include an “existence predicate” (see §5).
The above theory has semantics in the following structure [Jac99, HJP80]. By a
prelattice we mean a preorder which, considered as a category, has finite products
and coproducts; a Heyting prealgebra is a cartesian closed prelattice.
Definition 4.3. A (canonically presented) tripos [HJP80] consists of:
• A cartesian closed category T.
• An object Ω ∈ T, together with a lift of T(−,Ω) : Top → Set to the category
of Heyting prealgebras.
• For any product projection π : A × B → A, the precomposition functor π∗ :
T(B,Ω) → T(A × B,Ω) has both a left and a right adjoint, and the Beck-
Chevalley condition holds.
Examples 4.4. T can be a topos or quasitopos, with Ω the (strong-)subobject clas-
sifier. More generally, any complete Heyting algebra object Ω in a topos T (such
as the open sets of a topology) induces a tripos, with T(−,Ω) structured pointwise.
Non-pointwise examples include realizability; see [HJP80].
Our higher-order linear logic is exactly the same, except that now the propo-
sitions are instead equipped with the linear operations
⊠, ⊠,⊓,⊔,⊤,⊥,⊸, (−)
⊥,
d
,
⊔
, !, ?
and the relation ⊢ satisfies the rules of affine logic. The semantic notion is:
Definition 4.5. A (canonically presented) affine tripos is:
• A cartesian closed category T.
• An object Ω ∈ T, together with a lift of T(−,Ω) : Top → Set to the category
of semicartesian ∗-autonomous prelattices with Seely comonads.
• For any product projection π : A × B → A, the precomposition functor π∗ :
T(B,Ω) → T(A × B,Ω) has both a left and a right adjoint, and the Beck-
Chevalley condition holds.
Notation 4.6. If necessary to disambiguate, we use the annotations L for linear
and I for intuitionistic; e.g. “L-predicate” and “I-predicate”, or ΩL and ΩI.
We now describe the “Chu translation” of the intuitionistic context to the linear
context. We want ΩL to be the “subobject” of ΩI × ΩI classifying pairs of propo-
sitions (P+, P−) such that P+ ∧ P− = 0, so that T(A,ΩL) = Chu(T(A,ΩI),0).
There may be no such subobject, but fortunately (by [Bar96]) we can describe an
equivalent category to Chu(T(A,ΩI),0) whose objects are arbitrary pairs (P+, P−).
Theorem 4.7. Any tripos gives rise to an affine tripos over the same T, with
ΩL
def
= ΩI × ΩI and with T(A,ΩL) ∼= T(A,ΩI)×T(A,ΩI) structured by
((P+, P−) ≤ (Q+, Q−))
def
= (P+ ≤ Q+) and (Q− ∧ ¬Q+ ≤ P−)
and a natural equivalence T(A,ΩL) ≃ Chu(T(A,ΩI),0).
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Proof. The obvious inclusion Chu(T(A,ΩI),0) → T(A,ΩL) is full, since if Q+ ∧
Q− = 0 then Q− ∧ ¬Q+ = Q−. It is essentially surjective since any (P+, P−) ∈
T(A,ΩL) is isomorphic to (P+, P− ∧ ¬P+). Thus, T(A,ΩL) ≃ Chu(T(A,ΩI),0),
so it is a semicartesian ∗-autonomous prelattice. We define the quantifiers byd
x.P (x)
def
= (∀x.P+(x), ∃x.P−(x))
⊔
x.P (x)
def
= (∃x.P+(x), ∀x.P−(x)). 
Definition 4.8. We will refer to this translation of intuitionistic into linear higher-
order logic as the standard interpretation.9
Remark 4.9. The standard interpretation shows semantically that linear logic is “as
constructive” as intuitionistic logic. There is also a syntactic argument for this: ⊔
and
⊔
satisfy the same disjunction and existence properties as the intuitionistic ∨
and ∃. That is, from a closed proof of P ⊔Q we can extract either a proof of P or
Q, and from a closed proof of
⊔
x.P (x) we can extract a t such that P (t).
Remark 4.10. Our logics do not allow quantification over types (i.e. “for all types
A” internally to the logic). Thus, theorems about structured types (e.g. groups,
posets, topological spaces) are technically metatheorems. In particular, the axioms
of such structures are entailments P ⊢ Q, or equivalently ⊢ (P ⊸ Q), and hence
imply ⊢ !(P ⊸ Q). In other words, axioms are affirmative; see also Remark 6.2.
In §9 we will also need a natural numbers type N, with terms generated by
0 and succ, definitions by recursion, and proofs by induction. Semantically, this
means T has a natural numbers object and an induction principle for predicates.
Remark 4.11. In this paper we are focusing on the semantics of linear constructive
mathematics, specifically the standard interpretation. However, linear logic also has
a sound and complete proof theory, so that if we can prove a statement “linearly”
then it is true in all models, and in particular in the standard interpretation.
Formal linear proof theory can be found in references like [Gir87]. Informally, it
looks like classical logic except that each hypothesis may only be used once. Put
differently, the hypotheses of a theorem are implicitly combined with ⊠, and since
P 6≡ P ⊠P they cannot be “duplicated”. If we have P ⊠Q we can use both P and
Q (once each), whereas if we have P ⊓Q we can choose to use P or to use Q, but
not both. Similarly,
d
x.P (x) can only be applied to one value of x. And dually,
to prove P ⊠Q we prove P and Q with each hypothesis used only in one sub-proof,
while to prove P ⊓Q we can use each hypothesis in both sub-proofs.
A hypothesis of P ⊔ Q can be case-split, while a hypothesis of P ⊠ Q is used
by disjunctive syllogism (e.g. proving P⊥ to conclude Q). To prove P ⊔ Q we
prove P or prove Q, while to prove P ⊠ Q we can assume P⊥ to prove Q or vice
versa. Implication P ⊸ Q behaves as classically, including contraposition; proof by
contradiction is universally valid. (Intuitionistically, proof by contradiction implies
excluded middle P ∨¬P since ¬(P ∨¬P ) ≡ (¬P ∧P ) is a contradiction; but linearly
(P ⊔ P⊥)⊥ ≡ (P⊥ ⊓ P ) is no contradiction since we can’t use both P⊥ and P .)
In §11 we will pick up this thread again and consider whether linear constructive
mathematics can be justified on its own, as a replacement for intuitionistic con-
structive mathematics rather than just an exotic logic that can be interpreted into
9Calling it “the Chu interpretation” would be ambiguous, as the Chu construction produces
models of linear logic much more generally from closed symmetric monoidal categories. Our “stan-
dard interpretation” is specifically Chu(H,0) for the Heyting algebra H of intuitionistic proposi-
tions; another closely related Chu construction Chu(H, 1) was already mentioned in Remark 3.9.
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the latter. For now, we return to our primary focus on expressing definitions in
linear logic and translating them across the standard interpretation, although we
will occasionally mention or sketch a few linear proofs as well.
5. Intuitionistic sets and functions
For most of the paper, we will define concepts “naturally” in the linear context
and then pass across the standard interpretation to recover well-known intuitionistic
notions. But for sets and equality, we begin with the intuitionistic context, to fix
conventions. Thus, in this section we work in our intuitionistic higher-order logic.
As mentioned in Remark 4.2, we follow Bishop’s dictum:
The totality of all mathematical objects constructed in accordance
with certain requirements is called a set. The requirements of the
construction, which vary with the set under consideration, determine
the set.. . . Each set will be endowed with a binary relation = of equal-
ity. This relation is a matter of convention, except that it must be an
equivalence relation. . . [BB85, §2.1]
Thus a “Bishop set” has two ingredients: the “requirements” and the equality.
Bishop is precise about the latter (an arbitrary equivalence relation) but not the
former; we will formalize it in higher-order logic as a type with a predicate.
Definition 5.1. A pre-set is an (I-)type A equipped with a predicate E on it,
called the existence predicate.
Notation 5.2. If A is a pre-set with existence predicate E, we introduce the fol-
lowing abbreviations (presupposing x belongs to the underlying type A):
(x ∈ A)
def
= Ex ∃xA.P (x)
def
= ∃x.(Ex ∧ P (x))[
P (x) ⊢x∈A Q(x)
]
def
=
[
Ex ∧ P (x) ⊢x:A Q(x)
]
∀xA.P (x)
def
= ∀x.(Ex→ P (x)).
Definition 5.3. A set is a pre-set A with a predicate = on A×A such that
⊢x∈A x = x
x = y ⊢x,y∈A y = x
(x = y) ∧ (y = z) ⊢x,y,z∈A x = z.
Remark 5.4. We will never care about x = y unless we know that Ex and Ey.
Thus, we could require of any set that (x = y) ⊢ Ex ∧ Ey, replacing x = y by
Ex∧Ey∧ (x = y) if needed. With reflexivity, this implies Ex ≡ (x = x); so we could
define Ex
def
= (x = x) and dispense with both reflexivity and the new axiom, arriving
at a partial equivalence relation. This is common in tripos theory and realizability;
but divorcing existence from equality matches Bishop’s two-stage conception better,
as well as common mathematical practice (the construction of subsets is distinct
from quotient sets), and generalizes better to the linear context.
Notation 5.5. If P is a predicate on a type A, we write { x : A | P (x) } for the
pre-set with type A and Ex
def
= P (x). If A is given as a pre-set, then { x ∈ A | P (x) }
denotes the pre-set with Ex
def
= (x ∈ A)∧P (x). We often then define an equality (or
a structure inducing one; see §§8–10) making { x ∈ A | P (x) } a set. Otherwise, if
A is given as a set, we implicitly give { x ∈ A | P (x) } the same equality predicate.
Example 5.6. If A and B are sets, their cartesian product set is the product
type A×B with E(x, y)
def
= Ex∧Ey and ((x1, y1) = (x2, y2))
def
= (x1 = x2)∧ (y1 = y2).
LINEAR LOGIC FOR CONSTRUCTIVE MATHEMATICS 15
Example 5.7. Ω
def
= { x : Ω | ⊤ } is a set with (P = Q)
def
= (P ↔ Q).
Definition 5.8. A relation on a set A is a predicate P on its underlying type
such that
(x = y) ∧ P (x) ⊢x,y∈A P (y).
A relation is also called a subset of A, with x ∈ P meaning P (x). We overload
notation by writing P as { x ∈ A | P (x) }, though a subset is not itself a set.
The relations on a given set are closed under all the logical operations. Put
differently, the subsets of a set are a sub-Heyting-algebra of the predicates on its
underlying type. We write U ∩ V
def
= { x : A | (x ∈ U) ∧ (x ∈ V ) } and so on.
Definition 5.9. A function between two sets is an operation f : BA such that
⊢x∈A f(x) ∈ B
(x1 = x2) ⊢x1,x2∈A (f(x1) = f(x2)).
The function set is defined by
(A→ B)
def
=
{
f : BA
∣∣ ∀xA.(f(x) ∈ B) ∧ ∀xA1 xA2 .((x1 = x2)→ (f(x1) = f(x2)))
}
(f = g)
def
= ∀xA.(f(x) = g(x)).
Note the notation: the operation type is BA, the function set is A→ B.
Example 5.10. For a predicate P : ΩA, we have (x = y) ∧ P (x) ⊢x,y∈A P (y) if
and only if (x = y) ⊢x,y∈A (P (x) ↔ P (y)). Thus, a relation on A is the same as a
function from A to the set Ω (Example 5.7), so we can define the power set of A as
PA
def
= (A→ Ω). Its induced equality relation is (U = V )
def
= ∀xA.(x ∈ U ↔ x ∈ V ).
One final remark concerns the following alternative definition of “function”.
Definition 5.11. For sets A,B, an anafunction10 is a relation F on A×B that
is total and functional, i.e. such that
⊢x∈A ∃y
B.F (x, y)
F (x, y1) ∧ F (x, y2) ⊢x∈A,y1,y2∈B (y1 = y2).
If f : A → B is a function, then (f(x) = y) is an anafunction; the principle
of function comprehension (a.k.a. unique choice) says that every anafunction
is of this form. Function comprehension is not provable in higher-order logic, and
indeed fails in most triposes. Nevertheless, constructivists of Bishop’s school often
assume it implicitly (one can argue for it by positing a closer relationship between
“operations” and the existential quantifier than is implied by higher-order logic).
In the absence of function comprehension, it is often preferable to use anafunc-
tions rather than functions. For instance, this is how one builds the topos repre-
sented by a tripos (such as a realizability topos), and in particular how one recovers
the correct internal logic of a topos from its tripos of subobjects.
6. Linear sets and functions
We now switch to the linear context, for this section and the rest of the paper,
except when discussing the standard interpretation.
10This term is inspired by the “anafunctors” of [Mak96].
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Definition 6.1. A pre-set is an (L-)type A equipped with an existence predi-
cate E, which is affirmative:
Ex ⊢x:A !Ex.
As in Notation 5.2, for an L-pre-set A we introduce the following abbreviations.
(x !⊏− A)
def
= Ex
⊔
xA.P (x)
def
=
⊔
x.(Ex⊠ P (x))[
P (x) ⊢x!⊏−A Q(x)
]
def
=
[
Ex⊠ P (x) ⊢x:A Q(x)
] d
xA.P (x)
def
=
d
x.(Ex⊸ P (x)).
The symbol⊏− reminds us of linearity, and the ! reminds us that x !⊏− A is affirmative.
Remark 6.2. There are several reasons for the affirmativity restriction on Ex. One
is that when defining a set (in the structural sense, i.e. an object of the category of
sets), we never need to specify what it means for an element to not belong to that
set. The latter is only relevant when considering subsets of some previously given
set, which are a different thing (Definition 6.10). See also Remark 4.10.
Another reason is that this restriction makes the relation ⊢x!⊏−A behave like the
relation ⊢x:A. For instance, if P (x) ⊢x!⊏−A Q(x) and Q(x) ⊢x!⊏−A R(x), then that
means Ex ⊠ P (x) ⊢x:A Q(x) and Ex ⊠ Q(x) ⊢x:A R(x), and the usual transitivity
rule of linear logic allows us to conclude Ex⊠Ex⊠P (x) ⊢x:A R(x). But this is not
the same as P (x) ⊢x!⊏−A R(x) unless Ex⊠ Ex ≡ Ex, which affirmativity ensures.
A final reason pertains to the standard interpretation: affirmativity of Ex im-
plies that P (x) ⊢x!⊏−A Q(x) is equivalent to P (x)
+ ⊢x∈A Q(x)
+
together with
Q(x)
− ⊢x∈A P (x)
−
. If Ex were not affirmative, then we would also have to include
P (x)
+ ∧Q(x)− ⊢x:A ✁Ex, where ✁Ex would be a “nonexistence predicate”.
Definition 6.3. A set is a pre-set with a predicate ⊜ on A×A such that
⊢x!⊏−A x ⊜ x
x ⊜ y ⊢x,y!⊏−A y ⊜ x
(x ⊜ y)⊠ (y ⊜ z) ⊢x,y,z!⊏−A x ⊜ z.
A set is strong if it satisfies the stronger transitivity axiom
(x ⊜ y) ⊓ (y ⊜ z) ⊢x,y,z!⊏−A x ⊜ z.
Notation 6.4. If P is a predicate on a type A, we write !J x : A | P (x) K for the
pre-set with type A and Ex
def
= P (x). If A is a pre-set, !J x ⊏− A | P (x) K denotes the
pre-set with Ex
def
= (x !⊏− A)⊠P (x). We often then define an equality (or a structure
inducing one; see §§8–10) making !J x ⊏− A | P (x) K a set. Otherwise, if A is given
as a set, we implicitly give !J x ⊏− A | P (x) K the same equality predicate.
Under the standard interpretation, an L-pre-set is simply an I-pre-set, since
affirmative L-predicates are simply I-predicates. However, an L-set is an I-pre-set
with two predicates (=, 6=) such that
⊢x,y∈A ¬((x = y) ∧ (x 6= y))
⊢x∈A x = x
x = y ⊢x,y∈A y = x
x 6= y ⊢x,y∈A y 6= x
(x = y) ∧ (y = z) ⊢x,y,z∈A x = z
(x 6= z) ∧ (y = z) ⊢x,y,z∈A x 6= y
(x 6= z) ∧ (x = y) ⊢x,y,z∈A y 6= z.
LINEAR LOGIC FOR CONSTRUCTIVE MATHEMATICS 17
The axioms involving only = say that (A,E,=) is an I-set, and the last two axioms
say that 6= is an I-relation (Definition 5.8) on A×A. Given this, the first axiom is
equivalent to ⊢x∈A ¬(x 6= x). Thus we have:
Theorem 6.5. Under the standard interpretation:
(i) An L-set is an I-set equipped with an inequality relation: a relation 6= such
that ¬(x 6= x) and (x 6= y)→ (y 6= x) (i.e. it is irreflexive and symmetric).
(ii) It is strong if and only if 6= is an apartness, i.e. (x 6= z)→ (x 6= y)∨(y 6= z).
(iii) It is affirmative if and only if 6= is denial, (x 6= y) ≡ ¬(x = y).
(iv) It is refutative if and only if 6= is tight: ¬(x 6= y) ≡ (x = y). 
Example 6.6. If A and B are sets, their cartesian product set is the cartesian
product type A×B with E(x, y)
def
= Ex⊠ Ey, and
((x1, y1) ⊜ (x2, y2))
def
= (x1 ⊜ x2) ⊓ (y1 ⊜ y2).
Under the standard interpretation, this yields the cartesian product of I-sets with
the disjunctive product inequality (or product apartness):
((x1, y1) 6= (x2, y2))
def
= (x1 6= x2) ∨ (y1 6= y2).
Example 6.7. The tensor product set A ⊠B has the same underlying type and
existence predicate, but with equalities combined multiplicatively:
((x1, y1)
⊠
= (x2, y2))
def
= (x1 ⊜ x2)⊠ (y1 ⊜ y2).
In the standard interpretation, thus yields the weaker inequality
((x1, y1) 6
⊠
= (x2, y2))
def
= ((x1 ⊜ x2)→ (y1 6= y2)) ∧ ((y1 ⊜ y2)→ (x1 6= x2)).
If A and B have affirmative equality, so does A⊠ B, but A × B need not. If A
and B have strong or refutative equality, so does A×B, but A⊠B need not.
Example 6.8. The type Ω is a set with Ex
def
= ⊤ and
(P ⊜ Q)
def
= (P ˛ Q)
def
= (P ⊸ Q) ⊓ (Q⊸ P ). (6.9)
In the standard interpretation, this yields
(P = Q) ≡ (P+ ↔ Q+) ∧ (P− ↔ Q−).
(P 6= Q) ≡ (P+ ∧Q−) ∨ (P− ∧Q+).
We could also use ⊠ in (6.9), but using ⊓ yields a more useful 6= and has better
formal properties (see Example 6.14 and §8). In neither case is the equality strong,
nor is it affirmative nor refutative even if P and Q are both one or the other.
Definition 6.10. A relation on a set A is a predicate P such that
(x ⊜ y)⊠ P (x) ⊢x,y!⊏−A P (y).
A relation is strong if
(x ⊜ y) ⊓ P (x) ⊢x,y!⊏−A P (y).
We also refer to a relation as a subset, writing x ⊏− P instead of P (x), andJ x ⊏− A | P (x) K for P itself. This is similar to Notation 6.4, but without the !
because a subset need not be affirmative.
Theorem 6.11. Let U be an L-subset of an L-set A. In the standard interpretation:
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(i) U is a complemented subset as in [BB85, Chapter 3, Definition (2.2)]: a
pair of I-subsets (U, U) of A such that
(x ∈ U) ∧ (y ∈ U) ⊢x,y∈A (x 6= y).
(ii) It is strong if and only if U is strongly extensional (also called 6=-open):
(y ∈ U) ⊢x,y∈A (x 6= y) ∨ (x ∈ U).
Proof. The subset condition (x ⊜ y)⊠ (x ⊏− U) ⊢x,y!⊏−A (y ⊏− U) becomes
(x = y) ∧ (x ∈ U) ⊢x,y∈A (y ∈ U)
(x = y) ∧ (y ∈ U) ⊢x,y∈A (x ∈ U)
(x ∈ U) ∧ (y ∈ U) ⊢x,y∈A (x 6= y).
The first two say that U and U are I-subsets, and the last is the “strong disjoint-
ness” condition in (i). The “strong extensionality” condition in (ii) is exactly the
contrapositive information arising from the strong subset condition. 
Definition 6.12. A function between two sets is an operation f : BA such that
⊢x!⊏−A f(x) !⊏− B
(x1 ⊜ x2) ⊢x1,x2!⊏−A (f(x1) ⊜ f(x2)).
The function set is defined by
(A→ B)
def
= !
q
f : BA
∣∣ dxA.(f(x) !⊏− B)⊠dxA1 xA2 .((x1 ⊜ x2)⊸ (f(x1) ⊜ f(x2))) y
(f ⊜ g)
def
=
d
xA.(f(x) ⊜ g(x)).
Theorem 6.13. In the standard interpretation, an L-function f : A → B is an
I-function that is strongly extensional, i.e. (f(x1) 6= f(x2)) ⊢x1,x2∈A (x1 6= x2).
The inequality on A→ B is (f 6= g) ≡ ∃xA.(f(x) 6= g(x)). 
Example 6.14. We have (x ⊜ y) ⊠ P (x) ⊢ P (y) iff (x ⊜ y) ⊢ (P (x) ⊸ P (y)),
and symmetry of ⊜ then implies (x ⊜ y) ⊢ (P (x) ⊸ P (y)) ⊓ (P (y) ⊸ P (x)), i.e.
(x ⊜ y) ⊢ (P (x) ˛ P (y)). Therefore, relations on A are the same as functions from
A to the set Ω from Example 6.8. (Note that this requires the ⊓ in (6.9).) Thus
we can define the power set of A to be PA
def
= (A→ Ω). Its induced equality is
(U ⊜ V )
def
=
d
xA.((x ⊏− U) ˛ (x ⊏− V )).
In the standard interpretation, we have
(U 6= V )
def
= ∃xA.((x ∈ U ∧ x ∈ V ) ∨ (x ∈ U ∧ x ∈ V )).
Example 6.15. In the standard interpretation, an L-function f : A×B → C must be
strongly extensional for the disjunctive product inequality, (f(x1, y1) 6= f(x2, y2)) ⊢
(x1 6= x2) ∨ (y1 6= y2). By contrast, an L-function f : A ⊠ B → C need only be
strongly extensional in each variable separately: (f(x, y1) 6= f(x, y2)) ⊢ (y1 6= y2)
and (f(x1, y) 6= f(x2, y)) ⊢ (x1 6= x2). Both are useful notions; see Example 7.8.
Example 6.16. In particular, functions from B to PA = (A → Ω) classify subsets
not of A×B, but of A⊠ B. In the standard interpretation, an L-subset of A⊠B
is a pair of I-subsets U, U ⊆ A×B such that
((x, y1) ∈ U) ∧ ((x, y2) ∈ U) ⊢ (y1 6= y2)
((x1, y) ∈ U) ∧ ((x2, y) ∈ U) ⊢ (x1 6= x2)
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whereas an L-subset of A×B satisfies the stronger condition
((x1, y1) ∈ U) ∧ ((x2, y2) ∈ U) ⊢ (x1 6= x2) ∨ (y1 6= y2).
The L-relations on an L-set are closed under the additive connectives, as well as
linear negation. This defines the additive operations of set algebra:
U ⊓ V = J x | (x ⊏− U) ⊓ (x ⊏− V ) K U ⊔ V = J x | (x ⊏− U) ⊔ (x ⊏− V ) Kd
iUi = J x | di.(x ⊏− Ui) K ⊔iUi = J x | ⊔i.(x ⊏− Ui) K
U⊥ = J x | (x ⊏− U)⊥ K 6 = J x | ⊥ K .
We write U ⊑ V to mean
d
xA.((x ⊏− U)⊸ (x ⊏− V )); in the standard interpretation
this means that U ⊆ V and V ⊆ U . Since
d
commutes with ⊓, we have (U ⊜ V ) ≡
((U ⊑ V ) ⊓ (V ⊑ U)). By duality, U 6⊑ V means
⊔
xA.((x ⊏− U)⊠ (x 6⊏− V )).
Like linear negation, the complement of L-subsets is involutive (U⊥⊥ = U) but
not Boolean: U ⊔ U⊥ ?= A and U ⊓ U⊥ ?= 6 both assert that U is decidable.
Lemma 6.17. In the standard interpretation, an L-subset is nonempty, i.e. U 6⊜
6, if and only if its affirmative part is I-inhabited, i.e. ∃xA.(x ∈ U).
Proof. The definition of inequality on PA gives
(U 6⊜ 6)+
def
= ∃x.((x ∈ U ∧ x ∈ A) ∨ (x ∈ ∅ ∧ x ∈ U)) ≡ ∃x.(x ∈ U). 
Remark 6.18. As another concrete advantage of an involutive negation, recall that
classically we can express “there is at most one x with P (x)” either as “for all x, y,
if P (x) and P (y), then x = y” or “there do not exist x, y with x 6= y such that P (x)
and P (y)”. Intuitionistically these are no longer equivalent (unless 6= is tight), and
only the former is “correct”. But linearly they are again equivalent:
d
xy.((P (x) ⊠ P (y))⊸ (x ⊜ y)) ≡
(⊔
xy.((x 6⊜ y)⊠ P (x)⊠ P (y))
)⊥
.
In the standard interpretation, these statements yield the “correct” intuitionistic
version augmented by a strong uniqueness “if x 6= y and P (x), then  P (x)”. An
even stronger sort of uniqueness would arise from the strong linear conditiond
xy.((P (x) ⊓ P (y))⊸ (x ⊜ y)),
which in the standard interpretation yields “if x 6= y, then either P (x) or P (y)”.
Multiplicatives and exponentials do not generally preserve subsets, but they do
induce operations on subsets by a reflection or coreflection process:
U ⊠ˆ V
def
=
q
x : A
∣∣ ⊔yA.((x ⊜ y)⊠ (y ⊏− U)⊠ (y ⊏− V )) y
U ⊠ˇ V
def
=
q
x : A
∣∣ dyA.((x ⊜ y)⊸ ((y ⊏− U) ⊠ (y ⊏− V ))) y
!ˆU
def
=
q
x : A
∣∣ ⊔yA.((x ⊜ y)⊠ !(y ⊏− U)) y
?ˇU
def
=
q
x : A
∣∣ dyA.((x ⊜ y)⊸ ?(y ⊏− U)) y .
The poset of subsets of A thereby becomes semicartesian and ∗-autonomous with a
Seely comonad. In particular, as a replacement for the false equalities U ⊔U⊥ ?= A
and U ⊓ U⊥ ?= 6 we have the true ones U ⊠ˇ U⊥ = A and U ⊠ˆ U⊥ = 6, and
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the !ˆ-coalgebras form a “Heyting algebra of affirmative subsets”. In the standard
interpretation, !ˆU is the affirmative part of U with its inequality complement:
(x ∈ !ˆU)
def
= (x ∈ U)
(x ∈  ˆ!U)
def
= ∀yA.((y ∈ U)→ (x 6= y)).
Thus an “affirmative subset” (i.e. U = !ˆU) is determined by an ordinary I-subset.
Finally, we note that “anafunctions” (see Definition 5.11) also behave sensibly.
Definition 6.19. For L-sets A,B, an anafunction from A to B is a relation F
on A⊠B that is total and functional, i.e. such that
⊢x!⊏−A
⊔
yB.F (x, y)
F (x, y1)⊠ F (x, y2) ⊢x!⊏−A,y1,y2!⊏−B (y1 ⊜ y2).
Theorem 6.20. In the standard interpretation, an L-anafunction from A to B
corresponds to an I-anafunction that is “strongly extensional” in the sense that
F (x1, y1) ∧ F (x2, y2) ∧ (y1 6= y2) ⊢x1,x2∈A,y1,y2∈B (x1 6= x2).
Proof. An L-anafunction consists of two I-relations F, F on A×B such that
⊢x∈A,y∈B ¬(F (x, y) ∧ F (x, y))
F (x, y1) ∧ F (x, y2) ⊢x∈A,y1,y2∈B (y1 6= y2)
F (x1, y) ∧ F (x2, y) ⊢x1,x2∈A,y∈B (x1 6= x2)
⊢x∈A ∃yB.F (x, y)
⊢x∈A ¬∀yB . F (x, y)
F (x, y1) ∧ F (x, y2) ⊢x∈A,y1,y2∈B (y1 = y2)
F (x, y1) ∧ (y1 6= y2) ⊢x∈A,y1,y2∈B  F (x, y2).
The fourth and sixth axioms say that F is an I-anafunction. Given this, the second
and seventh say F (x, y2) ≡ ∃yB1 .(F (x, y1) ∧ (y1 6= y2)), which implies the first and
fifth, and unravels the third to the claimed strong extensionality property. 
A function is strongly extensional just when its corresponding anafunction is.
Thus, a function comprehension principle is equally sensible linearly as intuitionistic-
ally, and in its absence we can once again work with anafunctions instead.
7. Algebra
Roughly speaking, there are two approaches to intuitionistic constructive algebra.
The first uses apartness only minimally; inequality usually means denial ¬(x = y)
and is avoided as much as possible. For instance, apartness relations are absent
from [Joh77], and are only rarely used in [MRR88]. The second approach equips
all sets with inequalities (often tight apartnesses),11 and all classical definitions are
augmented by “strong negative” information such as anti-subgroups and anti-ideals.
This is the tradition of Heyting; see [TvD88b, Chapter 8].
The second approach gives more refined information. For instance, the real num-
bers are a field in the strong sense that any number apart from 0 is invertible; but
11Recall that for us, an inequality relation is irreflexive and symmetric, an apartness relation
additionally satisfies (x 6= z) ⊢ (x 6= y) ∨ (y 6= z), and is tight if ¬(x 6= y) ⊢ (x = y). In [TvD88b]
an “apartness” is necessarily tight (otherwise they speak of a “pre-apartness”), and in [MRR88]
it seems that no axioms are demanded in general of a relation called “inequality”.
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without apartness, all we can say is that they are a local ring in which every non-
invertible element is zero. However, carrying apartness relations around is tedious
and error-prone, and not every algebraic structure admits a natural apartness:
We could demand that every set come with an inequality, putting in-
equality on the same footing as equality. . .With such an approach,
whenever we construct a set we must put an inequality on it, and we
must check that our functions are strongly extensional. This is cum-
bersome and easily forgotten, resulting in incomplete constructions and
incorrect proofs. [MRR88, p31]
Moreover, rewriting all of algebra in “dual” form looks very unfamiliar to the classi-
cal mathematician, and even a constructive mathematician may find it unaesthetic.
Linear logic resolves this by automatically handling the “bookkeeping” of apart-
ness relations, allowing familiar-looking definitions to nevertheless carry the correct
constructive meaning. It also reveals the above two approaches as ends of a contin-
uum: I-sets with denial inequality are the L-sets with affirmative equality, while
I-sets with a (tight) apartness are the L-sets with a (refutative) strong equality.
There are also natural examples in between; see Example 7.8.
Definition 7.1. A group is an (L-)set G together with an element e !⊏− G and
functions m : G⊠G→ G and i : G→ G such that
⊢x!⊏−G m(x, e) ⊜ x ⊢x!⊏−G m(x, i(x)) ⊜ e
⊢x!⊏−G m(e, x) ⊜ x ⊢x!⊏−G m(i(x), x) ⊜ e
⊢x,y,z!⊏−G m(m(x, y), z) ⊜ m(x,m(y, z)).
A group is strong if m is a function on G×G.
As usual, we write xy and x−1 instead of m(x, y) and i(x).
Theorem 7.2. In the standard interpretation, an L-group consists of an I-group
equipped with an inequality relation such that
x−1 6= y−1 ⊢x,y∈G x 6= y
xu 6= xv ⊢x,u,v∈G u 6= v
xu 6= yu ⊢x,y,u∈G x 6= y.
The extra condition for G to be strong is
(xu 6= yv) ⊢x,y,u,v∈G (x 6= y) ∨ (u 6= v) (7.3)
which is equivalent to 6= being an apartness. In particular:
• An L-group with affirmative equality is precisely an I-group.
• A strong L-group with refutative equality is precisely a group with apartness
relation in the sense of [TvD88b, 8.2.2], i.e. an I-group with a tight apartness
for which the group operations are strongly extensional.
• An arbitrary L-group is precisely an I-group with a (symmetric irreflexive)
translation invariant inequality as in [MRR88, Exercise II.2.5]. 
The fact that (7.3) is equivalent to 6= being an apartness is a standard exercise
in constructive algebra. In fact, it can be proven purely in linear logic that an
L-group is strong if and only if it has strong equality.
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Definition 7.4. A subgroup of a group G is a subset H ⊑ G such that
⊢ (e ⊏− H)
(x ⊏− H) ⊢x!⊏−G (x
−1
⊏− H)
(x ⊏− H)⊠ (y ⊏− H) ⊢x,y!⊏−G (xy ⊏− H).
A subgroup is strong if it satisfies the stronger condition
(x ⊏− H) ⊓ (y ⊏− H) ⊢x,y!⊏−G (xy ⊏− H).
Theorem 7.5. In the standard interpretation, a L-subgroup H of G is:
(i) An I-subgroup H of the I-subgroup G; together with
(ii) An I-subset✚H of G satisfying the following axioms:
(x ∈ H) ∧ (y ∈✚H) ⊢x,y∈G (x 6= y)
(x−1 ∈✚H) ⊢x∈G (x ∈✚H)
(xy ∈✚H) ∧ (x ∈ H) ⊢x,y∈G (y ∈✚H)
(xy ∈✚H) ∧ (y ∈ H) ⊢x,y∈G (x ∈✚H).
Moreover:
• H is strong iff the last two axioms are replaced by the following stronger one:
(xy ∈✚H) ⊢x,y∈G (x ∈✚H) ∨ (y ∈✚H).
• An affirmative L-subgroup of an affirmative L-group is precisely an I-subgroup
of an I-group, together with its logical complement✚H
def
= { x ∈ G | ¬(x ∈ H) }.
• If G is refutative and strong, then H is refutative and strong if and only if✚H is
an antisubgroup compatible with the apartness in the sense of [TvD88b,
8.2.4] together with its logical complement. 
Definition 7.6. An L-subgroup H is normal if (x ⊏− H) ⊢ (yxy−1 ⊏− H).
In the standard interpretation, if H and G are affirmative then normality re-
duces to ordinary normality, whereas if they are strong and refutative it reduces to
normality for an antisubgroup [TvD88b, 8.2.7].
Theorem 7.7. Let H be a normal subgroup of G. Then (x ⊜H y)
def
= (xy−1 ⊏− H)
defines a new equality predicate on the underlying pre-set of G, and the resulting
set is again a group, denoted G/H.
Proof. The closure axioms of a subgroup directly imply the axioms of an equality
predicate. It remains to show that m and i are functions G/H⊠G/H → G/H and
G/H → G/H . For the first, we have
(x ⊜H y)⊠ (w ⊜H z) ≡ (xy
−1
⊏− H)⊠ (wz−1 ⊏− H)
⊢ (xy−1 ⊏− H)⊠ (ywz−1y−1 ⊏− H) (by normality)
⊢ (xy−1ywz−1y−1 ⊏− H)
≡ ((xw)(yz)−1 ⊏− H)
≡ (xw ⊜H yz).
Similarly, for the second we have
(x ⊜H y) ≡ (xy
−1
⊏− H) ⊢ (y−1xy−1y ⊏− H) ≡ (y−1x ⊏− H) ≡ (y−1 ⊜H x
−1). 
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Example 7.8. Let G = 2N be the set of infinite binary sequences, with pointwise
addition mod 2, and H
def
= J x ∈ G | ⊔m.dn.((m ⊑ n)⊸ (xn ⊜ 0)) K. Then G is a
strong group with refutative equality, while H is a normal subgroup that is neither
strong, affirmative, nor refutative. In the quotient G/H we have
(x ⊜ 0) ≡
⊔
m.
d
n.((m ⊑ n)⊸ (xn ⊜ 0))
(x 6⊜ 0) ≡
d
m.
⊔
n.((m ⊑ n)⊠ (xn ⊜ 1)).
That is, x ⊜ 0 if x is eventually 0, and x 6⊜ 0 if x is 1 infinitely often. Neither of these
is the Heyting negation of the other, so G/H is neither affirmative nor refutative.
Similarly, G/H is not strong, so in the standard interpretation its inequality is not
an apartness and its multiplication is not strongly extensional for the disjunctive
product inequality, though it is for the weaker equality on G/H ⊠G/H .
In [MRR88, p31] this example is used to argue that not all sets should have
inequalities. From our perspective, it shows instead that not all groups are strong.
A (commutative) ring is an abelian group (R,+, 0) with a multiplication
function · : R ⊠ R → R and unit 1 : R satisfying the usual axioms; it is strong if
both + and · are defined on R×R. In the standard interpretation:
• An affirmative L-ring is an ordinary I-ring.
• A strong refutative L-ring is a ring with apartness as in [TvD88b, 8.3.1]
(except that they also assume 0 6= 1).
• A general L-ring is an I-ring with an inequality such that (x 6= y)↔ (x−y 6= 0)
and (xy 6= 0)→ (y 6= 0).
An ideal is an additive subgroup J with (x ⊏− J) ⊢ (xy ⊏− J). In the standard
interpretation, in the affirmative case this is an ordinary I-ideal, while in the refu-
tative strong case it is an anti-ideal [TvD88b, 8.3.6]: an additive antisubgroup
✓J with (xy ∈ ✓J) → (x ∈ ✓J) ∧ (y ∈ ✓J). The quotient R/J of an L-ring by an
ideal is straightforward, and its standard interpretation yields the apartness on the
quotient of an apartness ring by the complement of an anti-ideal [TvD88b, 8.3.8].
Definition 7.9. Let J be an ideal of the L-ring R that is proper, i.e. 1 6⊏− J .
• J is ⊔-prime if (xy ⊏− J) ⊢ (x ⊏− J) ⊔ (y ⊏− J).
• J is ⊠-prime if (xy ⊏− J) ⊢ (x ⊏− J) ⊠ (y ⊏− J).
• R is ⊔-integral if (0) is proper and ⊔-prime.
• R is ⊠-integral if (0) is proper and ⊠-prime.
If J is proper, then R/J is ⊔-integral or ⊠-integral exactly when J is ⊔-prime
or ⊠-prime, respectively. In the standard interpretation:
• A ⊔-prime affirmative L-ideal in an affirmative L-ring is a proper I-ideal such
that (xy ∈ J) ⊢ (x ∈ J) ∨ (y ∈ J). An affirmative L-ring is ⊔-integral if
¬(0 = 1) and (xy = 0) ⊢ (x = 0) ∨ (y = 0); this is [Joh77, axiom I1].
• Similarly, an affirmative L-ring is ⊠-integral if it satisfies ¬(0 = 1) and [Joh77,
axiom I2]: (xy = 0) ∧ ¬(x = 0)→ (y = 0).
• A ⊠-prime strong refutative L-ideal in a strong refutative L-ring is an anti-
ideal ✓J in an I-ring with apartness that is proper (1 ∈ ✓J) and such that
(x ∈ ✓J) ∧ (y ∈ ✓J) ⊢ (xy ∈ ✓J), i.e. a prime anti-ideal as in [TvD88b, 8.3.10].
• Finally, an arbitrary L-ring is ⊠-integral if and only if 1 6= 0 and we have
(x 6= 0)∧(xy = 0)→ (y = 0) and also (x 6= 0)∧(y 6= 0)→ (xy 6= 0). Combined
with the above characterization of L-rings, this is precisely an integral domain
in the sense of [MRR88, Exercise II.2.7].
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Definition 7.10. Let J be a proper ideal of the L-ring R.
• J is ⊔-maximal if ⊢x:R (x ⊏− J) ⊔
⊔
y.(1− xy ⊏− J).
• J is ⊠-maximal if ⊢x:R (x ⊏− J) ⊠
⊔
y.(1− xy ⊏− J).
• R is a ⊔-field if (0) is proper and ⊔-maximal.
• R is a ⊠-field if (0) is proper and ⊠-maximal.
We write inv(x)
def
=
⊔
y.(xy ⊜ 1) for “x is invertible”; this is the second disjunct in
(either kind of) maximality for (0). The quotient R/J is a ⊔-field or ⊠-field if and
only if J is ⊔-maximal or ⊠-maximal, respectively. In the standard interpretation:
• An affirmative L-ring is a ⊔-field just when its corresponding I-ring satisfies
¬(0 = 1) and (x = 0) ∨ inv(x). These are called discrete fields (since they
necessarily have decidable equality) or geometric fields [Joh77, axiom F1].
• A general L-ring is a ⊠-field just when its corresponding I-ring with inequality
satisfies 0 6= 1 and (x 6= 0) → inv(x). This is precisely a field as in [MRR88]
with 6= irreflexive (in [MRR88] the zero ring is a “field” with 0 6= 0).
• A ⊠-field has strong refutative equality just when its I-ring has a tight apart-
ness; these are the Heyting fields of [MRR88] and the fields of [TvD88b].
• Strong refutative ⊠-maximal L-ideals are theminimal anti-ideals of [TvD88b].
• Finally, the affirmative L-rings that are ⊠-fields are the I-rings satisfying
¬(1 = 0) and ¬(x = 0)→ inv(x), which is [Joh77, axiom F2].
Remark 7.11. Standard interpretations of ⊔-fields are sometimes called “geometric
fields” because they are a geometric theory. However, ⊠-fields are also a geometric
theory if we include the inequality 6= as part of the theory. The apartness axiom
for 6= is also geometric; only the tightness axiom ¬(x 6= y) ⊢ (x = y) fails to be so.
In fact, writing a classical definition in linear logic and passing across the stan-
dard interpretation often (though not always) produces a geometric theory. It is a
sort of refinement of the “Morleyization” (see e.g. [Joh02, D1.5.13]).
8. Order
When equality is defined, we can either introduce order and topology as struc-
tures on a pre-set which induce an equality, or as structures on a set that might
determine the equality by a “separation” axiom. In general we prefer the former.
Definition 8.1. A preorder on an (L-)pre-set A is a predicate ⊑ on A×A with
⊢x!⊏−A (x ⊑ x) (x ⊑ y)⊠ (y ⊑ z) ⊢x,y,z!⊏−A (x ⊑ z).
A preorder is. . .
. . . strong if (x ⊑ y) ⊓ (y ⊑ z) ⊢x,y,z!⊏−A (x ⊑ z)
. . .⊔-total if ⊢x,y!⊏−A (x ⊑ y) ⊔ (y ⊑ x)
. . . ⊠-total if ⊢x,y!⊏−A (x ⊑ y) ⊠ (y ⊑ x).
If A has a preorder, then (x ⊜ y)
def
= (x ⊑ y)⊓ (y ⊑ x) makes A into a set, and ⊑
is then a relation defined on A ⊠ A. The sets-with-preorder we obtain in this way
are exactly the partial orders: sets with a preorder such that ⊑ is a relation on
A⊠A and is ⊓-antisymmetric, i.e. (x ⊑ y) ⊓ (y ⊑ x) ⊢x,y:!⊏−A (x ⊜ y).
Example 8.2. The equality on Ω from Example 6.8 is induced in this way from the
natural preorder (P ⊑ Q)
def
= (P ⊸ Q).
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In the standard interpretation, an L-partial-order contains two relations ≤ and
6≤; but it is often more suggestive to write x < y instead of y 6≤ x.
Theorem 8.3. In the standard interpretation, a partial order on an L-set A con-
sists of two I-relations ≤ and < such that
⊢x∈A (x ≤ x)
(x ≤ y) ∧ (y ≤ z) ⊢x,y,z∈A (x ≤ z)
(x ≤ y) ∧ (y ≤ x) ⊢x,y∈A (x = y)
(x < y) ∧ (y ≤ z) ⊢x,y,z∈A (x < z)
(x ≤ y) ∧ (y < z) ⊢x,y,z∈A (x < z)
(x < y) ⊢x,y∈A (x 6= y)
(x 6= y) ⊢x,y∈A ((x < y) ∨ (y < x)).
That is, ≤ is an I-partial-order, < is a “bimodule” over it, and for x, y ∈ A we
have (x 6= y) ≡ ((x < y) ∨ (y < x)). Moreover, the L-partial-order is. . .
• . . . strong if and only if < is cotransitive: (x < z) ⊢ (x < y) ∨ (y < z).
• . . . ⊠-total if and only if (x < y)→ (x ≤ y) (hence < is transitive).
• . . .⊔-total if and only if ≤ is total, (x ≤ y) ∨ (y ≤ x). 
Such “order pairs” appear often in constructive mathematics, but the only ab-
stract such definition I know of was in the Lean 2 proof assistant.12 Often either ≤
or < is the other’s negation (i.e. ⊑ is affirmative or refutative), but not always:
Example 8.4. Conway’s surreal numbers [Con01] are defined in classical logic by:
- If L,R are any two sets of numbers, and no member of L is ≥ any member of R, then there
is a number {L|R}. All numbers are constructed in this way.
- x ≥ y iff (no xR ≤ y and x ≤ no yL).
(For x = {L|R}, xL and xR denote typical members of L or R respectively.) Leaving
aside the problematic inductive nature of this definition, we can write it linearly as
(y ⊑ x)
def
=
(⊔
xR.(xR ⊑ y)
)⊥
⊓
(⊔
yL.(x ⊑ yL)
)⊥
≡
d
xR.(y ⊏ xR) ⊓
d
yL.(yL ⊏ x)
where ⊏ is its negation
(x ⊏ y)
def
= (y ⊑ x)⊥ ≡
⊔
xR.(xR ⊑ y) ⊔
⊔
yL.(x ⊑ yL).
In the standard interpretation, this yields a simultaneous inductive definition of ≤
and <, neither of which is the Heyting negation of the other; see [FS12] and [Uni13,
§11.6]. Omitting R yields the plump ordinals (see [Tay96] and [Uni13, Ex. 11.17]).
Recall that classically, if ≤ is a total order we can define x < y by ¬(y ≤ x) or
by (x ≤ y) ∧ (x 6= y), and recover x ≤ y as ¬(y < x) or as (x = y) ∨ (x < y). For
an “order pair” as in Theorem 8.3 that is ⊠-total, the former holds, but the latter
generally fails. However, in linear logic we can say:
12https://github.com/leanprover/lean2/blob/master/library/algebra/order.lean#L102;
it was removed in Lean 3. I am indebted to Floris van Doorn for pointing this out.
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Theorem 8.5. Let ⊑ be a refutative ⊠-total partial order, and write (x ⊏ y)
def
=
(y ⊑ x)⊥. Then we have
(x ⊏ y) ≡ (x ⊑ y)⊠ (x 6⊜ y) (8.6)
(x ⊑ y) ≡ (x ⊜ y) ⊠ (x ⊏ y). (8.7)
Proof. For any partial order we have
(x ⊑ y)⊠ (x 6⊜ y) ≡ (x ⊑ y)⊠ ((x ⊑ y) ⊓ (y ⊑ x))⊥
≡ (x ⊑ y)⊠
(
(x ⊑ y)⊥ ⊔ (y ⊑ x)⊥
)
≡
(
(x ⊑ y)⊠ (x ⊑ y)⊥
)
⊔
(
(x ⊑ y)⊠ (y ⊑ x)⊥
)
≡ ⊥ ⊔
(
(x ⊑ y)⊠ (y ⊑ x)⊥
)
≡ (x ⊑ y)⊠ (x ⊏ y).
This certainly implies x ⊏ y. Conversely, ⊠-total means (x ⊏ y) ⊢ (x ⊑ y),
while refutativity implies (x ⊏ y) ⊢ ((x ⊏ y) ⊠ (x ⊏ y)), so that (x ⊏ y) implies
(x ⊑ y)⊠ (x ⊏ y). This gives (8.6), while (8.7) is simply its de Morgan dual. 
Thus, while the constructive ≤ does not mean “less than or equal to”, at least
in some cases (such as R; see §9) it does mean “less than par equal to”.
9. Real numbers and metric spaces
In this section we assume a natural numbers type N permitting definitions by re-
cursion and proof by induction. We define addition and multiplication by recursion
in the usual way, and we define a preorder on N by recursion into Ω:
(0 ⊑ n)
def
= ⊤ (n+ 1 ⊑ 0)
def
= ⊥ (n+ 1 ⊑ m+ 1)
def
= (n ⊑ m).
The integers Z are the type N×N with ((a, b) ⊑ (c, d))
def
= (a+ d ⊑ b+ c), and the
rational numbers Q are Z× N with ((x, y) ⊑ (u, v))
def
= (x · (v + 1) ⊑ u · (y + 1)).
These preorders are affirmative, refutative, strong, and decidable, as are the induced
equalities (x ⊜ y)
def
= ((x ⊑ y) ⊓ (y ⊑ x)). (In all cases Ex
def
= ⊤.) In the standard
interpretation, they yield the usual partially ordered sets of numbers.
Definition 9.1. The Cauchy real numbers are the partially ordered L-set
Rc
def
= !
r
x : QN
∣∣∣ dnm.|xn − xm| ⊑ 1n+1 + 1m+1
z
(x ⊑ y)
def
=
d
n.
(
xn ⊑ yn +
2
n+1
)
(x ⊜ y)
def
= ((x ⊑ y) ⊓ (y ⊑ x)) ≡
d
n.|xn − yn| ⊑
2
n+1
.
Theorem 9.2. In the standard interpretation, the L-set Rc is the usual such I-set
with its usual linear order and induced equality and apartness. 
We can also define the algebraic structure of the Cauchy reals in linear logic. In
the terminology of §7, Rc is a strong ⊔-local ring that is a ⊠-field.
The Dedekind real numbers are a little more surprising. We first note that, just
as in classical logic, the notion of “one-sided cut” in linear logic doesn’t depend on
which side we use (or whether the cuts are open or closed).
Definition 9.3. Let L ⊑ Q.
• L is a lower set if
d
rs.(((s ⊏− L)⊠ (r ⊏ s))⊸ (r ⊏− L)).
• L is upwards-open if
d
r.((r ⊏− L)⊸
⊔
s.((r ⊏ s)⊠ (s ⊏− L))).
LINEAR LOGIC FOR CONSTRUCTIVE MATHEMATICS 27
• L is upwards-closed if
d
s.((
d
r.((r ⊏ s)⊸ (r ⊏− L)))⊸ (s ⊏− L)).
Dually, we have upper sets, downwards-open, and downwards-closed.
Theorem 9.4. The following L-sets are isomorphic:
!J L˚ ⊏− PQ | L˚ is an upwards-open lower set K
!J L ⊏− PQ | L is an upwards-closed lower set K
!J U˚ ⊏− PQ | U˚ is a downwards-open upper set K
!J U ⊏− PQ | U is a downwards-closed upper set K .
Proof. The isomorphisms are
L
def
= J s ⊏− Q | dr.((r ⊏ s)⊸ (r ⊏− L˚)) K U def= L˚⊥
L˚
def
= J r ⊏− Q | ⊔s.((r ⊏ s)⊠ (s ⊏− L)) K U˚ def= L⊥
U
def
= J r ⊏− Q | ds.((r ⊏ s)⊸ (s ⊏− U˚)) K L def= U˚⊥
U˚
def
= J s ⊏− Q | ⊔r.((r ⊏ s)⊠ (r ⊏− U)) K L˚ def= U⊥ 
Definition 9.5. We write C for any of the sets in Theorem 9.4, and we call its
elements cuts.
We give C the partial order induced from containment of lower sets. Thus, if we
write xL˚, xL, xU˚ , xU for the four representations of x ⊏− C, we have
(x ⊑ y) ≡ (xL˚ ⊑ yL˚) ≡ (xL ⊑ yL) ≡ (yU˚ ⊑ xU˚ ) ≡ (yU ⊑ xU )
(x ⊏ y) ≡ (yL˚ 6⊑ xL˚) ≡ (yL 6⊑ xL) ≡ (xU˚ 6⊑ yU˚ ) ≡ (xU 6⊑ yU ).
Using ⊔-totality of the order on Q, we can show that this order on C is ⊠-total. If we
identify r ⊏− Q with the cut rL˚
def
= J q ⊏− Q | q ⊏ r K, then Q is fully order-embedded
in C, and moreover for any x ⊏− C we have
(r ⊏ x) ≡ (r ⊏− xL˚) (x ⊏ r) ≡ (r ⊏− xU˚ )
(r ⊑ x) ≡ (r ⊏− xL) (x ⊑ r) ≡ (r ⊏− xU ).
Thus, we can define a cut x by specifing any one of the relations (− ⊏ x), (− ⊑ x),
(x ⊏ −), and (x ⊑ −) on Q which has the appropriate property. This is usually
more congenial than working explicitly with upper or lower subsets of Q.
In intuitionistic logic, it is common to work with two-sided cuts instead. But
because an L-subset is a complemented I-subset, in the standard interpretation our
one-sided L-cuts become two-sided I-cuts.
Theorem 9.6. In the standard interpretation, C corresponds to the set of pairs
(L,U) of I-subsets of Q such that L is an upwards-open lower set, U is a downwards-
open upper set, and L < U . Its induced order is
((L1, U1) ≤ (L2, U2)) ≡ ((L1 ⊆ L2) ∧ (U2 ⊆ U1)).
((L1, U1) < (L2, U2)) ≡ ∃r.((r ∈ L2) ∧ (r ∈ U1)).
Proof. By Theorem 6.11, an element of PQ is a disjoint pair (L,✓L) of subsets of
Q. To say that it is an L-lower-set means that L is an I-lower-set and ✓L is an
I-upper-set. Given this, disjointness is equivalent to L < ✓L. And to say that it
is L-upwards-open means that L is I-upwards-open and ✓L is I-downwards-closed.
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Finally, the bijection between open and closed upper cuts (or, dually, lower ones)
is also true intuitionistically:
U
def
=
{
s
∣∣ ∃r.((r < s) ∧ (r ∈ ✓L))
}
✓L
def
= { r | ∀s.((r < s)→ (s ∈ U)) } . 
The I-set of pairs (L,U) in Theorem 9.6 is also called the set of (rational)
cuts [Ric98], or sometimes the interval domain. It is distinct from R even clas-
sically, containing additionally all closed intervals [a, b] for −∞ ≤ a ≤ b ≤ ∞.
Definition 9.7. The Dedekind real numbers Rd are the L-set of x !⊏− C with
• boundedness:
⊔
qQ.(q ⊏ x)⊠
⊔
qQ.(x ⊏ q)
• ⊔-locatedness:
d
rQsQ.((r ⊏ s)⊸ ((r ⊏ x) ⊔ (x ⊏ s))).
All cuts are “ ⊠-located”, (r ⊏ s)⊸ ((r ⊏ x) ⊠ (x ⊏ s)), by ⊠-excluded-middle.
In the standard interpretation, Rd is the usual set of Dedekind reals.
Now, there are at least two natural ways to define addition on C:
(x k y ⊏ q)
def
=
⊔
rQsQ.((q ⊜ r + s)⊠ (x ⊏ r)⊠ (y ⊏ s))
(q ⊏ x j y)
def
=
⊔
uQvQ.((q ⊜ u+ v)⊠ (u ⊏ x)⊠ (v ⊏ y)).
If x, y !⊏− Rd, one can prove that xjy ⊜ xky, and in the standard interpretation
they give the usual addition on Dedekind reals:
(x+ y < q)
def
= ∃rs.((q = r + s) ∧ (x < r) ∧ (y < s)) (9.8)
(q < x+ y)
def
= ∃rs.((q = r + s) ∧ (r < x) ∧ (s < y)). (9.9)
However, for cuts, k and j are distinct. In the standard interpretation, with + for
I-cuts defined using (9.8)–(9.9), we have (xk y < q) ≡ (x+ y < q), but q < xk y is
weaker than q < x+ y. One place where this matters is in defining metric spaces.
Definition 9.10. A cut-metric on an L-pre-set X is an operation d : CX×X with
⊢x,y!⊏−X 0 ⊑ d(x, y)
⊢x!⊏−X d(x, x) ⊜ 0
⊢x,y,z!⊏−X d(x, z) ⊑ d(x, y) k d(y, z).
For any cut-metric, (x ⊑ y)
def
= (d(x, y) ⊜ 0) defines a preorder. If d is symmetric,
this is already an equality making X a set; otherwise we can symmetrize it as in
§8. (We can also symmetrize d directly with d′(x, y)
def
= sup(d(x, y), d(y, x)).) If X
is already a set and d a function, the usual metric separation condition (d(x, y) ⊜
0) ⊢ (x ⊜ y) makes its equality coincide with that obtained in this way.
In particular, if d(x, y) !⊏− Rd for all x, y, then the standard interpretation of X
is an I-quasi-metric space, and an I-metric space if we impose symmetry.
Now suppose X is a cut-metric space and we have a ⊏− X and B ⊑ X . As
observed intuitionistically in [Ric98], C is a complete lattice (which Rd is not, con-
structively13); thus we can define the distance from a to B as an infimum:
d(a,B)
def
= infb⊏−B d(a, b).
13The “strongly monotonic cuts” or “MacNeille reals” are also a complete lattice, but their
meets and joins involve double-negation, making them less useful than those of C; see [Ric98, §3].
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Rather than defining infima in L-posets in general, we simply make this explicit:
(d(a,B) ⊏ q)
def
=
⊔
bX .((b ⊏− B)⊠ (d(a, b) ⊏ q))
(q ⊑ d(a,B)) ≡
d
bX .((b ⊏− B)⊸ (q ⊑ d(a, b)))
(q ⊏ d(a,B)) ≡
⊔
r.((q ⊏ r) ⊠
d
bX .((b ⊏− B)⊸ (r ⊑ d(a, b)))).
Even if each d(a, b) is a Dedekind real, d(a,B) may not be. But the observation
of Richman [Ric98] is that if we treat d(a,B) as a cut, then its inequality relations
to rational (hence also real) numbers are exactly what we would expect of such a
“distance”. In the standard interpretation, these become:
(d(a,B) < q) ≡ ∃bX .((b ∈ B) ∧ (d(a, b) < q))
(q ≤ d(a,B)) ≡ ∀bX .(((b ∈ B)→ (q ≤ d(a, b))) ∧ ((d(a, b) < q)→ (b ∈ B))).
If B is affirmative, q ≤ d(a,B) becomes Richman’s ∀bB.(q ≤ d(a, b)). We also have:
(d(a,B) ⊑ d(a,B′))
≡
d
q.((d(a,B′) ⊏ q)⊸ (d(a,B) ⊏ q))
≡
d
q.((
⊔
b′X .((b′ ⊏− B′)⊠ (d(a, b′) ⊏ q)))⊸
⊔
bX .((b ⊏− B)⊠ (d(a, b) ⊏ q)))
≡
d
q.
d
b′X .(((b′ ⊏− B′)⊠ (d(a, b′) ⊏ q))⊸
⊔
bX .((b ⊏− B)⊠ (d(a, b) ⊏ q))).
At least in the Dedekind-real case, we can then write ε
def
= q − d(a, b′) to getd
ε.
d
b′X .((b′ ⊏− B′)⊸
⊔
bX .((b ⊏− B)⊠ (d(a, b) ⊏ d(a, b′) + ε)))
whose standard interpretation, when B,B′ are affirmative, reduces to Richman’s:
(d(a,B) ≤ d(a,B′)) ≡ ∀ε.∀b′X .((b′ ∈ B′)→ ∃bX .((b ∈ B)∧(d(a, b) < d(a, b′)+ε))).
Still following [Ric98], we can define the (directed) Hausdorff distance:
d(A,B)
def
= supa⊏−A d(a,B) = supa⊏−A infb⊏−B d(a, b)
(d(A,B) ⊏ q) ≡
⊔
q′.((q′ ⊏ q)⊠
d
aX .((a ⊏− A)⊸
⊔
bX .((b ⊏− B)⊠ (d(a, b) ⊏ q′))))
between two subsets A,B ⊑ X . However, unlike Richman, we can show:
Theorem 9.11. The Hausdorff distance is a cut-metric on PX.
Proof. The proof of the triangle inequality is essentially the same as that of its “up-
per portion” in [Ric98, §6]. We must show if d(A,B)kd(B,C) ⊏ q then d(A,C) ⊏ q.
By definition of k, we have
⊔
rs.((q ⊜ r+ s)⊠ (d(A,B) ⊏ r)⊠ (d(B,C) ⊏ s)). Now
d(A,B) ⊏ r and d(B,C) ⊏ s yield r′ ⊏ r and s′ ⊏ s such thatd
aX .((a ⊏− A)⊸
⊔
bX .((b ⊏− B)⊠ (d(a, b) ⊏ r′)))d
bX .((b ⊏− B)⊸
⊔
cX .((c ⊏− C)⊠ (d(b, c) ⊏ s′))).
Thus, for any a ⊏− A we get b ⊏− B with d(a, b) ⊏ r′, then from b we get c ⊏− C with
d(b, c) ⊏ s′. Hence d(a, c) ⊑ d(a, b) k d(b, c) ⊏ r′ + s′ ⊑ q, so that d(A,C) ⊏ q. 
In [Ric98, §6] Richman notes that the cut-valued Hausdorff distance fails the tri-
angle inequality if addition of cuts is defined by (9.8)–(9.9). He concludes that one
should forget the “lower cut” part of the Hausdorff distance. We conclude instead
that the relevant addition of cuts is k, not (9.8)–(9.9). Indeed, (9.8)–(9.9) are sus-
pect right away, as it is not even clear whether they can be obtained simultaneously
as the standard interpretation of any single definition of addition for L-cuts.
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The other example in [Ric98, §6] where cuts seem to have problems can also be
resolved with linear logic. Suppose (intuitionistically) A is an abelian group and p
a prime with
⋂
n p
nA = 0, i.e. (∀n.∃c.(a = pnc)) ⊢a∈A (a = 0). Define
|a|
def
= inf
{
p−n
∣∣ a ∈ pnA } = inf { p−n ∣∣ ∃c.(a = pnc) } .
In classical mathematics, this defines an “ultranorm”, i.e. |a + b| ≤ sup(|a|, |b|).
Intuitionistically, if we interpret |a| as a cut and sup as the binary supremum
(the union of lower parts and intersection of upper parts), then the upper part of
|a + b| ≤ sup(|a|, |b|) holds but the lower part can fail. Our solution is to replace
this “additive” binary supremum with a multiplicative one: for cuts x, y we define
(sup ⊠(x, y) ⊏ q)
def
= (x ⊏ q)⊠ (y ⊏ q).
Now let A be an abelian L-group and (
d
n.
⊔
cA.(a ⊜ pnc)) ⊢a∈A (a ⊜ 0), and define
|a|
def
= inf
q
x
∣∣ ⊔n.((x ⊜ p−n)⊠⊔c.(a ⊜ pnc)) y .
I claim that then we have |a+ b| ⊑ sup ⊠(|a|, |b|). This is again just like the “upper
part” proof from [Ric98]: if |a| ⊑ p−n and |b| ⊑ p−n, then a ⊜ pnc and b ⊜ pnd for
some c, d, so that a + b ⊜ pn(c + d) and hence |a + b| ⊑ p−n. So in both cases, it
is not that cuts are inadequate, but that the operations on cuts sometimes need to
use multiplicative connectives rather than additive ones.
Remark 9.12. We end this section by mentioning a situation in which the stan-
dard interpretation, as we have presented it, is not completely satisfactory. An
I-sequence of real (or rational) numbers is Cauchy if
∀ε.∃k.∀nm.(n > k ∧m > k → |xn − xm| ≤ ε), (9.13)
and diverges [BB85, §2.3] if
∃ε.∀k.∃nm.(n > k ∧m > k ∧ |xn − xm| > ε). (9.14)
These are formal de Morgan duals, so if we define Cauchy-ness of an L-sequence byd
ε.
⊔
k.
d
nm.(n > k ⊠m > k⊸ |xn − xm| ⊑ ε),
then its linear negation is divergence.
However, in the absence of countable choice, it is often better to define a Cauchy
sequence to come with a function Kε, and Bishop presumably understands a diver-
gent sequence to come with functions Nk,Mk. But the corresponding formulas
∃K.∀ε.∀nm.(n > Kε ∧m > Kε → |xn − xm| ≤ ε) (9.15)
∃ε.∃NM.∀k.(Nk > k ∧Mk > k ∧ |xNk − xMk | > ε). (9.16)
are no longer de Morgan duals. Go¨del’s “Dialectica” interpretation [Go¨d58, dP89b,
dP06, Hof11] automatically does this sort of “Skolemization”, so that (9.13) and (9.14)
would be interpreted as (9.15) and (9.16) respectively; but this doesn’t solve the
problem that the two pairs are not each other’s negations.
Another approach is to write (9.13) and (9.14) using the propositions-as-types
interpretation into dependent type theory. This gives
∏
ε
∑
k
∏
n,m(n > k ∧m > k → |xn − xm| ≤ ε) (9.17)∑
ε
∏
k
∑
n,m(n > k ∧m > k ∧ |xn − xm| > ε) (9.18)
which include the Skolem functions automatically, due to the “type-theoretic axiom
of choice”
∏
x:A
∑
y:B C(x, y)
∼=
∑
f :A→B
∏
x:A C(x, f(x)). It should be possible to
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realize (9.17) and (9.18) as linear negations in a fiberwise Chu construction on a
(non-posetal) comprehension category, whose internal logic would be some kind of
dependent linear type theory (a “classical linear” version of [Va´k14]).
10. Topology
Finally, we consider point-set topologies. There are many classically-equivalent
ways to define a topology; first we consider neighborhood relations.
Note that the preorder (U ⊑ V )
def
= ∀xA.((x ⊏− U) ⊸ (x ⊏− V )) on ΩA makes
sense even if A is only a pre-set, making ΩA into a set.
Definition 10.1. A topology on a pre-set A is a predicate Ť on A× ΩA with
(x Ť U) ⊢ (x ⊏− U) (reflexivity)
(x Ť U)⊠ (U ⊑ V ) ⊢ (x Ť V ) (isotony)
⊢ (x Ť A) (nullary additivity)
(x Ť U)⊠ (x Ť V ) ⊢ (x Ť U ⊓ V ) (binary additivity)
(x Ť U) ⊢ (x Ť J y | y Ť U K) (transitivity)
Isotony implies each (x Ť −) is a relation on the set ΩA. We define a preorder
on A by (x ⊑ y)
def
=
d
U.((y Ť U)⊸ (x Ť U)), making A into a set as well, such that
Ť is a relation on A ⊠ ΩA. Moreover, an arbitrary predicate U : ΩA is contained
in a smallest relation Uˆ
def
=
q
x ∈ A
∣∣ ⊔yA.((x ⊜ y)⊠ U(y)) y, and by definition of
equality on A we have (x Ť U) ˛ (x Ť Uˆ). Thus, Ť is determined by its behavior
on subsets, so we may consider it to be a relation on A⊠PA. If we instead assume
A is given as a set and Ť as a relation on A⊠PA, then to ensure that the equality
coincides with the one constructed above we must impose the T0 axiom
(
d
U.((x Ť U) ˛ (y Ť U))) ⊢ (x ⊜ y).
Now a relation on A ⊠ PA is equivalently a function int : PA → PA, and
Definition 10.1 translates into a linear version of an “interior operator”:
(i) int(U) ⊑ U
(ii) (U ⊑ V )⊸ (int(U) ⊑ int(V ))
(iii) int(A) ⊜ A
(iv) int(U) ⊠ˆ int(V ) ⊑ int(U ⊓ V )
(v) int(int(U)) ⊜ int(U)
plus the following form of the T0 axiom:
(vi) (
d
U.((x ⊏− int(U)) ˛ (y ⊏− int(U))))⊸ (x ⊜ y).
The most interesting of these axioms is (iv), which is a version of the classical
int(U) ∩ int(V ) ⊆ int(U ∩ V ) (10.2)
that uses an additive intersection on the right but a multiplicative one on the left.
This may look more surprising than the (equivalent) binary additivity axiom for
Ť in Definition 10.1, since in the latter ⊠ is a logical connective while ⊓ is a set
operation. However, the following example suggests that this odd-looking mixture
of additive and multiplicative intersections is exactly right:
Example 10.3. Any cut-metric space (Definition 9.10) has a topology defined by:
(x Ť U)
def
=
⊔
εQ>0 .
d
yX .((d(x, y) ⊏ ε)⊸ (y ⊏− U)).
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To prove binary additivity, from (x Ť U)⊠(x Ť V ) we can get εU and εV , and then
choose ε
def
= min(εU , εV ) to prove x Ť (U ⊓ V ). Note that here we need to use both
hypotheses at once, so they must be combined with ⊠ rather than ⊓. We then have
to show that given y with d(x, y) ⊏ ε we have y ⊏− U⊓V , i.e. that (y ⊏− U)⊓(y ⊏− V ).
For y ⊏− U we use d(x, y) ⊏ ε ⊑ εU and the hypothesis from x Ť U , and dually.
Note that here we need to use the same hypothesis d(x, y) ⊏ ε in proving both
subgoals y ⊏− U and y ⊏− V , so they must be combined with ⊓ rather than ⊠.
Axiom (iv) is further clarified by writing it in terms of cl(U)
def
= (int(U⊥))
⊥
:
cl(U ⊔ V ) ⊑ cl(U) ⊠ˇ cl(V ) (10.4)
Since (−)⊥ is involutive, in linear logic cl and int contain the same data. But
intuitionistically, “closure operators” do not respect unions: a point may lie in the
closure of U ∪ V without our being able to decide which of U or V it lies in the
closure of. Our (10.4) remedies this by taking one of the unions to be multiplicative.
On the other hand, classically and intuitionistically the converse of (10.2) always
holds, so (10.2) is equivalent to closure of the fixed points of int (the open sets) under
binary intersections. It is harder to express (iv) using “open L-subsets”.
We now move on to the standard interpretation of an L-topology. This is rather
complicated, since not only does Ť give rise to two relations, each L-subset U is
actually two (disjoint) I-subsets. We start with some familiar special cases.
Theorem 10.5. Under the standard interpretation, an L-topology such that
(x Ť U) ⊢ !(x Ť U) ∧ (x Ť !U)
corresponds exactly to a T0 I-topology on a pre-set A. The induced inequality is
(x 6= y)
def
= ∃U.((x≪ U) ∧ ¬(y ≪ U)) ∨ ∃U.(¬(x≪ U) ∧ (y ≪ U)).
Proof. The assumption implies that Ť is determined by a single I-relation ≪ be-
tween points of A and I-subsets of A. The axioms on Ť then translate to the
usual definition of an I-topology in terms of a neighborhood relation. Finally, our
definition of equality in a topological space corresponds to the T0 axiom. 
If U is an I-subset of an I-set A with inequality 6=, we write (x /∈ U)
def
= ∀yA.((y ∈
U) → (x 6= y)). This is the same as saying that x belongs to the inequality
complement of U , i.e. x 6⊏− !ˆU in the standard interpretation.
Theorem 10.6. Under the standard interpretation, an L-topology such that14
(x Ť U) ⊢ !(x Ť U) (10.7)
(x Ť ?U)⊠ !(x ⊏− U) ⊢ (x Ť U) (10.8)
corresponds to a point-set pre-apartness space satisfying the reverse Kol-
mogorov property in the sense of [BV11, p20],15 i.e. an I-set with an inequality
14A simpler attempt at (10.8) would be (x Ť ?U) ⊢ (x Ť U), but that is inconsistent with
reflexivity at least in the standard interpretation, since ?(0, 0) = (1, 0).
15[BV11] writes x /∈ K to mean ¬(x ∈ K); our x /∈ K is written there as x ∈ ∼K.
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6= and a relation ⊲⊳ between points and I-subsets such that
(x ⊲⊳ K) ⊢ (x /∈ K) (10.9)
(x ⊲⊳ K) ∧ (L ⊆ K) ⊢ (x ⊲⊳ L) (10.10)
⊢ (x ⊲⊳ ∅) (10.11)
(x ⊲⊳ K) ∧ (x ⊲⊳ L) ⊢ (x ⊲⊳ K ∪ L) (10.12)
∀x.((x ⊲⊳ K)→ (x /∈ L)) ⊢ ∀x.((x ⊲⊳ K)→ (x ⊲⊳ L)) (10.13)
(x ⊲⊳ K) ∧ ¬(y ⊲⊳ K) ⊢ (x 6= y), (10.14)
and which also satisfies the additional “forwards Kolmogorov property” that
(x 6= y) ⊢ (x ⊲⊳ {y}) ∨ (y ⊲⊳ {x}). (10.15)
Proof. Since U ⊑ ?U , and x Ť U is affirmative by (10.7), the converse of (10.8)
also holds. Thus Ť is determined by its behavior on refutative L-subsets, hence by
one I-relation between points and I-subsets. We define (x ⊲⊳ K)
def
= (x Ť (¬K,K)).
But note that (¬K,K) is not an L-subset, and as noted above Ť is determined
by its behavior on L-subsets; thus x ⊲⊳ K is also equivalent to x Ť ?ˇ(¬K,K) =
({ y | y /∈ K } ,K). In particular, reflexivity of Ť implies (10.9).
Statements (10.10)–(10.12) are straightforward translations of L-isotony and ad-
ditivity. The direct translation of L-transitivity is (x ⊲⊳ K) ⊢ (x ⊲⊳ { y | ¬(y ⊲⊳ K) }),
which is equivalent to (10.13) and (10.14) together. Our definition of equality yields
(x 6= y) ≡ ∃K.((x ⊲⊳ K) ∧ ¬(y ⊲⊳ K)) ∨ ∃K.(¬(x ⊲⊳ K) ∧ (y ⊲⊳ K)).
However, if x ⊲⊳ K and ¬(y ⊲⊳ K), then y ∈ { z | ¬(z ⊲⊳ K) }, whence x ⊲⊳ {y};
whereas conversely if x ⊲⊳ {y} then we can take K
def
= {y}. Thus, we have
(x 6= y) ≡ (x ⊲⊳ {y}) ∨ (y ⊲⊳ {x}).
The right-to-left implication follows from (10.9), while the left-to-right is (10.15).

Thus, I-topologies and apartnesses are special cases of L-topologies. But in some
sense these restrictions on L-topologies miss the point, because virtually no natu-
rally defined L-topologies satisfy them! In the standard interpretation, a general
L-topology consists of two relations ≪ and 6≪ between points and complemented
subsets (Theorem 6.11); and even for Dedekind-metric spaces neither is the Heyting
negation of the other, and both parts of a complemented subset are used.
Example 10.16. The L-topology of a cut-metric in the standard interpretation is
(x≪ (U, U))
def
= ∃εQ>0 .∀yX .(((d(x, y) < ε)→ (y ∈ U)) ∧ ((y ∈ U)→ (d(x, y) ≥ ε)))
(x 6≪ (U, U))
def
= ∀εQ>0 .∃yX .((d(x, y) < ε) ∧ (y ∈ U)).
This is degenerate only in that the relation 6≪ only depends on U , not on U . But
since both conjuncts in (x≪ (U, U)) remain true under shrinking ε, we can distrib-
ute the quantifiers and take a minimum of the two ε’s to write
(x≪ (U, U)) ≡ (∃ε
Q>0 .∀yX .((d(x, y) < ε)→ (y ∈ U)))
∧ (εQ>0 .∀yX .((y ∈ U)→ (d(x, y) ≥ ε)))
where the first conjunct depends only on U and the second only on U . Thus, we
may think of x≪ (U, U) as “x is in the interior of U and is apart from U”.
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⊢ ¬((x≪ (U, U)) ∧ (x 6≪ (U, U)))
(x≪ (U, U)) ⊢ x ∈ U
x ∈ U ⊢ (x 6≪ (U, U))
(x≪ (U, U)) ∧ (U ⊆ V ) ∧ ( V ⊆ U) ⊢ (x≪ (V, V ))
(x 6≪ (V, V )) ∧ (U ⊆ V ) ∧ ( V ⊆ U) ⊢ (x 6≪ (U, U))
(x≪ (U, U)) ∧ (x 6≪ (V, V )) ⊢ ∃y.(y ∈ U ∩ V )
⊢ (x≪ (A, ∅))
⊢ ¬(x 6≪ (A, ∅))
(x≪ (U, U)) ∧ (x≪ (V, V )) ⊢ (x≪ (U ∩ V, U ∪ V ))
(x≪ (U, U)) ∧ (x 6≪ (U ∩ V, U ∪ V )) ⊢ (x 6≪ (V, V ))
(x≪ (U, U)) ⊢ (x≪ (
{
y
∣∣ y ≪ (U, U)
}
,
{
y
∣∣ y 6≪ (U, U)
}
))
(x 6≪ (
{
y
∣∣ y ≪ (U, U)
}
,
{
y
∣∣ y 6≪ (U, U)
}
)) ⊢ (x 6≪ (U, U))
Figure 1. The standard interpretation of an L-topology
In the general case, we can write the axioms of an L-topology in terms of≪ and
6≪, as in Figure 1. But they are not very familiar, because we are used to spaces
that are degenerate as in Example 10.3. This suggests the following definition.
Definition 10.17. A unified topology on an I-pre-set A consists of three predi-
cates ≪, ⊲⊳, δ on A× ΩA such that:
• ≪ is a topology in the usual sense:
(x≪ U) ⊢ (x ∈ U)
(x≪ U) ∧ (U ⊆ V ) ⊢ (x≪ V )
⊢ (x≪ A)
(x≪ U) ∧ (x≪ V ) ⊢ (x≪ U ∩ V )
(x≪ U) ⊢ (x≪ { y | y ≪ U })
• ⊲⊳ satisfies the following apartness axioms:
(x ⊲⊳ K) ⊢ ¬(x ∈ K) (∗)
(x ⊲⊳ K) ∧ (L ⊆ K) ⊢ (x ⊲⊳ L)
⊢ (x ⊲⊳ ∅)
(x ⊲⊳ K) ∧ (x ⊲⊳ L) ⊢ (x ⊲⊳ K ∪ L)
(x ⊲⊳ K) ⊢ (x ⊲⊳ { y | y δ K }) (10.18)
• δ satisfies the following “closure space” axioms:
(x ∈ K) ⊢ (x δ K)
(x δ K) ∧ (K ⊆ L) ⊢ (x δ L)
⊢ ¬(x δ ∅) (∗)
(x δ (K ∪ L)) ∧ (x ⊲⊳ K) ⊢ (x δ L) (10.19)
(x δ { y | y δ K }) ⊢ (x δ K)
• The following compatibility condition holds:
(x≪ U) ∧ (x δ K) ⊢ ∃y.(y ∈ U ∩K). (10.20)
In the presence of the other axioms, either of the axioms (∗) implies the other.
Note that transitivity for ⊲⊳ (10.18) involves δ, while binary additivity for δ (10.19)
(in constructively sensible form derived from ⊠) involves ⊲⊳.
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Theorem 10.21. Given a unified topology, if we define
(x≪ (U, U))
def
= (x≪ U) ∧ (x ⊲⊳ U) (x 6≪ (U, U))
def
= (x δ U)
then we obtain an L-topology (in the standard interpretation) as in Figure 1. 
Not every L-topology has this form, but those coming from cut-metrics do, with
(x≪ U)
def
= ∃εQ>0 .∀yX .((d(x, y) < ε)→ (y ∈ U))
(x ⊲⊳ K)
def
= ∃εQ>0 .∀yX .((y ∈ K)→ (d(x, y) ≥ ε))
(x δ K)
def
= ∀εQ>0 .∃yX .((d(x, y) < ε) ∧ (y ∈ K)).
Example 10.22. Recall the Hausdorff cut-metric on PX from Theorem 9.11:
(d(A,B) ⊏ q) ≡
⊔
q′.((q′ ⊏ q)⊠
d
aX .((a ⊏− A)⊸
⊔
bX .((b ⊏− B)⊠ (d(a, b) ⊏ q′)))).
In the standard interpretation, if A,B are affirmative, then:
• d(A,B) < q means that there is a q′ < q such that for any point a ∈ A, there
exists a point b ∈ B with d(a, b) < q′.
• q ≤ d(A,B) means for any q′ < q, there is a point a ∈ A such that every point
b ∈ B has q′ ≤ d(a, b).
Thus, in this case:
• A ≪ U means there is an ε > 0 such that U contains all subsets B for which
there is an ε′ < ε such that every point of A is ε-close to some point of B.
• A ⊲⊳ K means there is an ε > 0 such that for every B ∈ K and ε′ < ε there is
a point of A that is at least ε′-far from every point of B.
• A δ K means for any ε > 0 there is a B ∈ K and an ε′ < ε such that every
point of A is ε′-close to a point of B.
Thus, our standard interpretation suggests that rather than taking one of neigh-
borhoods, apartness, or nearness as primary, it is more natural to have all structures
in parallel. Of course, Definition 10.17 is rather unwieldy; but Definition 10.1 is
quite simple, suggesting it may be easier to just stay in linear logic. In the next
section we consider this possibility more seriously.
11. Towards linear constructive mathematics
So far, our primary motivation for linear logic has been parasitic on intuitionistic
logic, by way of the Chu construction. Thus, a mathematician who cares about intu-
itionistic logic (for any reason) may use linear logic instead, obtaining intuitionistic
conclusions via the standard interpretation. However, there are other reasons one
might care about the “linear constructive mathematics” we have started developing
in this paper. One is that it admits other interesting models.
Example 11.1. Linear logicians are familiar with many ∗-autonomous categories,
such as coherence spaces and phase spaces. Any complete semicartesian ∗-autonomous
lattice with Seely comonad yields an affine tripos over Set. I expect there are “real-
izability linear triposes” coming from linear combinatory algebras [AHS02, AL05].
And Dialectica constructions [dP89b] also act on fibrations [Hof11]; though they
are not semicartesian, hence move beyond affine logic to general linear logic.
Example 11.2. Any Boolean algebra is semicartesian and ∗-autonomous, with ⊠ ≡
⊓, ⊠ ≡ ⊔, and !P
def
= P . Thus, linear logic also specializes directly to classical logic.
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More generally, on a Boolean algebra we can take any meet-preserving comonad
to be !, such as the interior operator of a topology acting on a powerset. Thus,
any classical topological space X gives rise to an affine tripos whose propositions
are subsets of X , with the affirmative and refutative ones being open and closed
respectively. This relates to the “modal” view of sheaves from [AK08, AKK14].
Example 11.3.  Lukasiewicz logic is a semicartesian ∗-autonomous structure on
the unit interval [0, 1], with ⊤ = 1, ⊥ = 0, and
P ⊓Q = min(P,Q)
d
x.P (x) = infx P (x) P ⊠Q = max(0, P +Q− 1)
P ⊔Q = max(P,Q)
⊔
x.P (x) = supx P (x) P ⊠Q = min(1, P +Q)
P⊥ = 1− P P ⊸ Q = min(1, 1− P +Q).
It also admits a Seely comonad defined by !1 = 1 and !P = 0 for P < 1. An L-set in
this model is precisely a metric space with all distances ≤ 1. (The distance d(x, y)
is actually the inequality x 6⊜ y.) It is strong iff it is an ultrametric space, and
affirmative iff it is discrete. Functions are nonexpansive maps, and anafunctions
(Definition 6.19) are nonexpansive maps between metric completions. The L-set
Ω = [0, 1] has its usual metric |x−y|, and the function set A→ B has the supremum
metric. For a fixed affirmative L-set A, the L-subsets of A are fuzzy sets with
universe A, with their usual induced metric. Finally, (closed upper) L-cuts x !⊏−
C are non-decreasing right-continuous functions R → R; hence bounded L-cuts
are cumulative distribution functions of random variables, with Dedekind L-reals
corresponding to constant random variables.
Thus, linear constructive mathematics has a potentially rich model theory, justi-
fying it further to the pragmatist. But what about the philosophical constructivist,
in the tradition of Bishop, say? I believe that one can also motivate linear construc-
tive mathematics on purely philosophical grounds; what follows is one attempt.
We begin by agreeing with Brouwer’s critique of excluded middle, “P or not P”,
as a source of non-constructivity. However, the classical mathematican’s belief in
this law is not contentless; one may say that the constructivist and the classicist are
using the word “or” to mean different things. The constructivist using intuitionistic
logic expresses the classical mathematician’s “or” as ¬¬(P ∨ Q); but the classical
mathematician may rebel against the implication that she is unconsciously inserting
double negations everywhere. A more even-handed approach is to stipulate both
kinds of “or” on an equal footing: the constructivist’s P ⊔ Q says that we know
which of P or Q holds; while the classicist’s P ⊠Q says. . . something else.
Before addressing exactly what it says, we consider negation. Intuitionistically,
¬P means that any proof of P would lead to an absurdity. But after this definition,
one immediately observes that it is not very useful and should be avoided. So why
did we bother defining negation in that way? A more useful notion of “negation”
is the polar opposite of a statement, i.e. the most natural and emphatic way to
disprove it. The opposite of “every x satisfies P (x)”, in this sense, is “there is an
x that fails P (x)”: a respectable constructive disproof of a universal claim should
provide a counterexample. Similarly, the opposite of “P and Q” is “either P fails
or Q fails”, and so on. This negation is involutive, with strict de Morgan duality
for quantifiers, conjunctions, and disjunctions.
The most natural way that “if P then Q” can fail is if P is true and Q is false.
But the opposite of “P and not Q” is “Q or not P”, so the involutivity of negation
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means that the latter should be equivalent to “if P then Q”. In particular, the
tautology “if P then P” is equivalent to “P or not P”, i.e. excluded middle. Thus,
the “or” appearing here must be the classical one ⊠. That is, “if P then Q” (which
we may as well start writing as P ⊸ Q) is equivalent to P⊥ ⊠Q.
This tells us what P ⊠Q means: it means P⊥⊸ Q, i.e. if P fails then Q must be
true. But any sort of disjunction is symmetric, so P ⊠Q should also be equivalent
to Q⊥ ⊸ P . Thus, contraposition must hold: P ⊸ Q is equivalent to Q⊥ ⊸ P⊥.
This, in turn, implies that we can do proofs by contradiction.
Proof by contradiction is generally considered non-constructive. For instance, a
constructive proof of “there exists an x such that P (x)” ought to specify x, whereas
proof by contradition seems to subvert this. But does it really? If we try to prove
“there exists an x such that P (x)” by contradiction, we would begin by assuming
“for all x, not P (x)”. . . and we can only use that assumption by specifying an x!
Non-constructivity only enters if we use that assumption more than once, giving
different values of x, and derive a contradiction without determining which value
of x satisfies P . Thus, we can remain constructive in the presence of proof by
contradiction by imposing a “linearity” restriction that each hypothesis can be
used only once. This is essentially the content of Girard’s comment:
. . . take a proof of the existence or the disjunction property; we use
the fact that the last rule used is an introduction, which we can-
not do classically because of a possible contraction. Therefore, in
the. . . intuitionistic case, ⊢ serves to mark a place where contraction. . . is
forbidden. . . . Once we have recognized that the constructive features
of intuitionistic logic come from the dumping of structural rules on a
specific place in the sequents, we are ready to face the consequences of
this remark: the limitation should be generalized to other rooms, i.e.
weakening and contraction disappear. [Gir87, p4]
We now let ⊓ and ⊠ be the de Morgan duals of ⊔ and ⊠, and calculate
(P ⊠Q)⊸ R ≡ (P⊥ ⊠Q⊥) ⊠R ≡ P⊥ ⊠ (Q⊥ ⊠ R) ≡ P ⊸ (Q⊸ R).
Thus, to maintain the “deduction theorem” that we prove Q ⊸ R by proving R
with Q as an extra hypothesis, we must implicitly combine hypotheses with ⊠.
The behavior of ⊓ can be deduced by duality: a hypothesis P ⊓ Q may as well
be used by contradiction, requiring us to show (P ⊓Q)⊥ ≡ P⊥ ⊔ Q⊥; and since
this is the constructive “or” it requires us to either show P⊥ or Q⊥. Thus, to use a
hypothesis P ⊓Q we must either use P or Q, but not both. Note the utter reversal
of the historical origin of the linear connectives:
The most hidden of all linear connectives is par [ ⊠], which came to
light purely formally as the De Morgan dual of [⊠] and which can be
seen as the effective part of a classical disjunction. [Gir87, p5].
Finally, the linearity restriction is sometimes too onerous. For instance, the ax-
ioms of a group must be used many times in the proof of any theorem in group
theory. Since we are here regarding the linearity restriction as simply a syntactic
discipline to which we subject ourselves in order to maintain constructivity, we may
allow ourselves to ignore it in certain cases as long as we keep track of where this
happens and prevent ourselves in some other way from introducing nonconstructiv-
ity in those cases. This is the purpose of the modality !: it marks hypotheses, like
the axioms of a group, that we allow ourselves to use more than once. The price we
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pay is that when checking an axiom of the form !P , we cannot use proof by contra-
diction (or more precisely, if we try to do so, the hypothesis we get to contradict is
not P⊥ but the weaker ?(P⊥)
def
= (!P )⊥). But this is rarely bothersome: when was
the last time you saw someone prove that something is a group by assuming that
it isn’t and deriving a contradiction? (See also Remarks 6.2 and 4.10.)
Whether or not the reader finds the foregoing discussion convincing, I believe it
proves that it is possible to argue for linear logic, rather than intuitionistic logic,
on philosophical constructivist grounds. Ultimately, of course, the proof of the
pudding is in the eating: whether linear constructive mathematics can stand on its
own depends on how much useful mathematics can be developed purely in linear
logic. In this paper we have only scratched the surface by exploring a few basic
definitions, with the standard interpretation as a guide for their correctness.
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